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Abstract
The Lisbon summit of the European Council in March 2000 declared the number of
people living in poverty and social exclusion in the European Union to be
unacceptable, and called for steps to tackle the issue, beginning with the setting of
targets for particular indicators. The targets suggested have been broad in nature but
have largely concentrated on national averages. This paper seeks to marry this
approach with the EU’s traditional focus on regional cohesion, by developing
regional indicators of well-being and exclusion for EU countries. It draws on a range
of sources to put together indicators in five dimensions of well-being: material well-
being, health, education and participation in two spheres – productive and social. It
explores, first, how far national indicators disguise geographical inequalities in these
different dimensions; and second, the extent to which regional performance differs
according to which dimension is being examined. At the same time, the paper draws
attention to the limits of currently available data, in light of the fact that one key
aspect of the Lisbon summit conclusions was a commitment to the collection of
better data on poverty and social exclusion in the EU.
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41. Introduction
The EU has long been committed to greater social cohesion in Europe. The
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 called prominently for the ‘strengthening of economic and
social cohesion’ so as to promote the Union’s ‘overall harmonious development’
(Articles 2 and 130a). Cohesion in this context has been understood to refer to
regional disparities: a series of regional policies and funds have aimed to raise
average incomes in poorer regions up to the EU mean, while the European
Commission’s series of Cohesion Reports (European Commission 1996 and 2001)
have focused heavily on regional indicators.
More recently, however, there has been a move towards a greater focus on
poverty and social exclusion at individual level, culminating in the Lisbon summit of
the European Council in March 2000. The summit conclusions declared the number
of people living in poverty and social exclusion in the EU to be unacceptable, and
called for decisive steps to tackle the issue, beginning with the setting of national
targets for particular indicators. The Social Agenda subsequently agreed at the Nice
summit in December 2000 called on member states to draw up national plans of
action for tackling social exclusion, and in Stockholm in March 2001 the Commission
presented a provisional set of target indicators for the EU as a whole. After an
extensive consultation process, a revised list of indicators was adopted at the Laeken
Summit in December 2001.
This paper calls for a marriage of these two approaches. The Cohesion
Reports are regionally focused but stick to very traditional measures of well-being –
largely regional GDP and employment measures. The indicators agreed in Laeken
are much broader in nature, spanning a number of diverse aspects of life, but they
are almost exclusively to be measured at national level (Social Protection Committee,
2001). One indicator, the coefficient of variation of regional unemployment rates, has
been included to track regional disparities.
The need for greater information about internal disparities in social indicators
was broached in a report commissioned by the Belgian Presidency of the EU to aid
the debate: Atkinson et al. (2002) argued that concerns about regional differences
arise for all dimensions of social cohesion and that there is no justification for giving
primacy to unemployment or any other single indicator. They suggested that a better
way of keeping geographical inequality high up on the agenda would be to track
regional disparities (subject to data availability) in each of the measures suggested as
national indicators, along with breakdowns by other key variables such as gender.
While the Atkinson report was in general very influential in shaping the final
choice of indicators, this particular proposal appears to have been overlooked. This
paper, however, attempts to put it into practice. It explores regional disparities in a
range of different cohesion measures, and looks at the correlation between different
indicators. It asks, first, how far national average figures disguise regional pockets of
deprivation on different indicators; and second, how far performance on different
measures overlaps. The motivation for the second question is twofold. We want to
know whether there are regions which suffer from multiple deprivation, and where
these regions are; and we want to see how reasonable it is to use just one measure as
a proxy for deprivation in other spheres.
5Data constraints loom large in a regional study, and ‘subject to availability’
turns out to be a significant caveat. Many of the indicators we might like to track are
simply not available by region, while household surveys often do not contain
regional samples large enough to be helpful. The paper is upfront about these
constraints. Indeed, one key aspect of the conclusions of the Lisbon summit was a
commitment to the collection of better data on poverty and social exclusion in the
EU, so identifying the limits of currently available data in itself seems a timely and
useful exercise. At the same time, while there are many holes in the picture, there is
still much that can be said about the pattern of regional disparity across the EU, and
of the degree to which the story changes when different indicators are examined.
The following section discusses the importance of looking at regional
disparities at all and the level of region at which the paper’s analysis takes place.
Section 3 looks at the choice of indicators used in the paper and highlights the
question of measurement. Sections 4 to 8 each examine indicators in one domain of
well-being, while Section 9 provides an overview and some conclusions.
2. Regions: what and why?
Why is cohesion between regions important?
The first question that needs to be addressed is why we should look at regional
disparities at all. There are clear practical reasons for interest in regional differentials
in welfare. First, an understanding of where deprivation is concentrated is important
in the formulation of targeted policy responses. Second, an analysis of regional
differences can also assist in the development of preventative policies, by facilitating
the development of hypotheses about the nature of causal mechanisms at work. Both
of these are arguments that apply to groups in general, with one’s region of
residence just one example of membership of a group (gender and ethnicity are
others). An additional reason for examining regional disparities in particular is that,
in many EU countries, local authorities and regions hold responsibility for provision
of key aspects of public services including health and education. Keeping track of
disparities in outcomes then becomes a way of measuring the success of alternative
policy regimes, and is as relevant at regional as at national level (although regional
variation in starting conditions will of course complicate such comparisons).
There are also political reasons for concern about inequality in how well
regions fare. Politicians usually have a regional interest to defend, ensuring that
geographical differentials remain high up the political agenda; while national
governments (and international bodies like the EU) will want to keep all parts of
their jurisdiction happy to avoid discontent and (at the extreme) secessionist
demands.
But are also there welfare reasons for concern? On the surface it may seem
obvious that there are, but it is a question worthy of deeper consideration. Why, for
instance, should a situation in which the poverty rate in the South East is the same as
that in Yorkshire be regarded as preferable to a situation in which the poverty rate is
higher in Yorkshire and lower in the South East (assuming for present purposes that
the two regions had similar populations)?
6There seem to me to be two reasons to worry about inter-group disparities in
themselves, both of which can be applied to regions. The first is if the inequality is
held to reflect discrimination or injustice in the way one of the groups is being
treated. While overt discrimination does not seem a plausible explanation of regional
disparities, a charge of injustice may in some circumstances apply. Inter-group
differences raise the question of why one group is doing better than another. If the
infant mortality rate has been reduced to four deaths per 1,000 in one part of the
country, why can this not be achieved elsewhere? In some aspects of well-being at
least, inter-group disparities suggest that more could be done for the worst-
performing groups. Of course, two important assumptions are required for this
argument to hold: first, that the nation-state has a responsibility to ensure that
national wealth is evenly distributed; and second, that inter-regional mobility is
limited.
However, this still only gives us a weak case for regional cohesion. To return
to the example above, it makes the non-controversial claim that lowering the poverty
rate in Yorkshire while holding the rate in the South East constant would be a good
thing to do (assuming we begin from a situation where the rate in Yorkshire is
higher). But is there a case for the stronger claim that the rate should be lowered in
Yorkshire, even if this required higher poverty in the South East? For instance, we
could bring about a fall in disparity in regional poverty rates by taking £100 from a
family £50 above the poverty line in the South East and giving it to a family £50
below the poverty line in Yorkshire. But should the social welfare function identify
people by where they live in this way?
In a static model there appears to be no reason why between-group
disparities should cause greater concern than within-group differences. From behind
a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, a rational individual who stood an equal chance of
being sent to live in the South East or Yorkshire would be indifferent between a
situation in which the poverty rate was zero in the South East and 20 percent in
Yorkshire and one in which the poverty rate was 10 percent in both regions. In both
scenarios, she stands a 10 percent chance of finishing poor. (Alternatively, she may
well opt for the former situation, on the grounds that if she is to be poor she would
prefer to be in greater company. See d’Ambrosio and al., 2002.)
However, introducing a dynamic element changes the situation. If one’s
concern is not just with whether or not one will be allocated into poverty, but also
with what happens next and to one’s children, the choice from behind the veil looks
rather different. For instance, being unemployed in a low unemployment region
may offer less in the way of companionship than being unemployed in a region of
high unemployment, but more chances of finding a job. Regional levels of poverty
and unemployment may also be important in reinforcing or moderating inter-
generational transfer mechanisms.
In his 1988 paper, ‘Why Should We Care About Group Inequality?’, Loury
puts forward the following case for concern about differences in outcomes for ethnic
groups. He assumes that people begin life with endowments of social capital, ‘non-
transferable advantages of birth which are conveyed by parental behaviours bearing
on later-life productivity’ (p.254). Further, families group themselves into social
clusters, within which local public goods are provided uniformly to the young. Peer
influences, friendship networks and contacts which generate information about the
world of work are all examples of such goods. If these community goods (or indeed
7‘bads’) are provided exclusively to cluster members, with outsiders excluded, and if
people tend to cluster within ethnic groups and not across them, he argues that
historically generated differences between the groups (in income, for example) will
not disappear over time as they might otherwise be expected to do, but will tend to
persist, even where there are no underlying differences in tastes or abilities.
‘The inequality of family circumstances generated by historical
economic discrimination is exacerbated by differential access to the
benefits of those quasi-public resources available only in the
affiliational clusters…Or, if you prefer, a positive intragroup
externality is exerted by the relatively more numerous higher income
[ethnic] majority families on the lower income [ethnic] majority
families of the same communities’ (p.256).
There are some problems with applying this argument to the case of regional
disparities, the most obvious being that Loury’s very point is that mere geographic
proximity will not guarantee the sharing of community goods. Yet the essence of the
argument still seems relevant. (Once again, we require the assumption of limited
inter-regional mobility, but this seems particularly justified in the case of poorer
groups.) It appears very likely that children growing up poor in poor communities
will have less chance of finding an exit strategy than those living and going to school
in mixed peer groups (even if the day to day effects of being poor are felt more
deeply among the latter group). There is indeed evidence to support this: in a review
of the literature on this topic, Haveman and Wolfe (1995) find that:
‘growing up in a neighbourhood with “good” characteristics (e.g.,
residents with more education and income, and less unemployment
and welfare recipiency) has a positive effect on a child’s choices
regarding schooling and earnings’ (p.1871).
Burgess et al. (2001) find a small but significant role for school and area
characteristics in explaining later adult earnings, controlling for individual and
family characteristics.
If regional characteristics do have an impact, the most equitable outcome is
then to iron out regional disparities (and to make the transfer from the non-poor
household in the South East to the poor household in Yorkshire) – although it must
be said that the regions we are able to work with here are on a rather larger scale to
any of the area categories used in the research referred to. This is the issue we turn to
now.
Which level of region?
I have argued that there are both practical and ethical reasons for concern about
regional disparities. But this leads us to the question of which is the right level of
region to look at. This paper focuses on the ‘NUTS1’ region, of which there are 74
altogether in the EU, including twelve in the UK (North West, South East etc), eight
in France, sixteen in Germany and seven in Spain.1 It is clearly a fairly aggregated
level: the regions average nearly 5 million people, and six EU countries consist of
1
NUTS is the EU acronym for Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics.
8just one NUTS1 region each (Portugal, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg and
Denmark2).
That we lose the ability to isolate internal disparities in a country the size of
Portugal, with 10 million inhabitants, illustrates the weakness of using NUTS1 as our
regional level. It would be easy to make a case for analysis at a more detailed level:
the smaller NUTS2 regions, corresponding to county level in the UK, région in
France, and province in Italy, would seem a more promising starting point. For
instance, the travel-to-work area corresponds more closely to the NUTS2 region. If it
is the area within which people are likely to travel it may also be the relevant
comparison group for relative poverty and exclusion measures. In addition, in
several countries regional government coincides with the NUTS2 region (this is true
in Italy and Spain, while the French région has considerable planning powers; see
Putnam, 1992 and Norton, 1994). Finally, NUTS2 regions are sufficient in number to
allow analysis of the relations between different indicators within a country: there
are 37 NUTS2 regions in the UK, for example, and 22 in France.
However, the choice of the NUTS1 region is imposed by data availability.
NUTS2 level analysis is simply out of the question for many of the variables
examined in the paper. In particular, household panel surveys rarely have sufficient
sample sizes to allow detailed analysis at this level. Furthermore, while a lower level
might be preferable, disparities between NUTS1 regions remain of considerable
interest given that the standard is comparison between national average figures. At
the same time, the structural factors driving economic opportunities operate on a
fairly wide scale – in this respect NUTS1 level analysis may be the more appropriate.
In addition, in some countries the level of regional government is in fact the NUTS1
level: this will be true for England if devolution goes ahead, and is already the case
for Scotland and Wales and for Germany. (One minor advantage of the NUTS1
region worth noting is that the regions are more similar to one another in size than is
the case at NUTS2 level. There are still huge differences: the largest NUTS1 region,
North Rhine/Westphalia, has nearly 18 million inhabitants while the smallest,
Bremen, has under 700,000 and the second smallest, Brussels, fewer than a million.
But the ratio of largest to smallest is now in the region of twenty-five rather than one
hundred.)
3. Choice of indicators – and how do we measure
disparity?
The EU mission was to find indicators of poverty and social exclusion. This paper
takes a broader approach, looking for measures of regional well-being. It does this
for two reasons.
2
Åland Island in Finland is in fact a separate NUTS1 region, as are the Portuguese islands of
Madeira and the Azores, but these are not analysed separately here: they are much smaller
than other NUTS1 regions and in many cases separate data are not available for them.
9First, the broader approach seems the better starting-point when there is still
much to be learned about regional disparities even in a standard indicator such as
average household income.
Second, while the concept of social exclusion continues to dodge efforts to pin
it down definitively, it is broadly agreed that it is concerned with overlap between
deprivation in several spheres. Thus according to the UK government, social
exclusion is ‘a short-hand term for what can happen when people or areas suffer
from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, high
crime environment, bad health and family breakdown’ (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001,
p.10). The EU Task Force has similarly called for social exclusion to be analysed as
‘the problem field determined by the link between low income position, bad labour
market position and disadvantages concerning non-monetary aspects of life’
(Eurostat, 2000, p.33), and the Commission’s recent report on Income, Poverty and
Social Exclusion consequently looks explicitly at the share of the poor who are
deprived in other spheres (Eurostat, 2000). (Burchardt et al (2001) are an exception
here: they argue that lack of participation in any one of the four ‘key activities’ they
identify is sufficient for social exclusion, although they also investigate the extent of
exclusion on multiple dimensions.)
This introduces difficulties for defining social exclusion using regional level
data. We know whether a region suffers from high unemployment and whether
mortality rates in the region are high and education levels low. But in few cases can
we link data sources to discover whether the unemployed are those same
individuals with low skills and poor health.3
Of course, we could develop a measure of how far a region is excluded, as
opposed to the share of individuals within the region suffering from exclusion: the
Social Exclusion Unit report above refers to areas as well as individuals. (See e.g.
Glennerster et al, 1999, on issues surrounding area exclusion in the UK.) But the
regions I am using here are rather too large for this to be a plausible approach: can
an area the size of the North East of England be said to be excluded? It seems more
sensible to start off by exploring whether it can be said to have lower well-being.
(Once our well-being indicators are assembled, we may be able to make some
statements about multiple deprivation, and from there about regional exclusion.)
Interestingly, once away from the issue of multiple dimensions of exclusion,
there turns out to be little difference between the indicators we would choose to
measure well-being and those we would choose to measure exclusion. The Atkinson
report (pp.73-4) stresses the importance of capturing cumulative disadvantage, and
calls for continued efforts to make this possible, but opts for the most part to
measure deprivation in different dimensions separately. But the indicators chosen
bear strong similarities to those examined here. This is perhaps in part because social
inclusion is effectively seen as synonymous with well-being, making exclusion its
inverse; and in part because the share of people who are excluded is itself an
important measure of the well-being of a society.
3
The European Community Household Panel allows many of these links to be made, but
sample sizes at regional level are in general not large enough to allow extensive analysis of
the interaction between variables.
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The paper aims to measure five dimensions of well-being: material well-
being, health, education and literacy, and participation in two spheres – productive
and social. A concept of well-being (or conversely of deprivation) broken down into
these broad areas is widely used and accepted, although with variations. The
participation domain is often limited to the labour market alone, for instance. The
UNDP Human Poverty Index for industrialised countries includes indicators for
each of the first four, with participation treated as a single domain and represented
by long term unemployment (HPI2, see UNDP 1998). Robinson and Oppenheim
(1998) propose social exclusion indicators in four areas: income, labour market,
health and education.
Burchardt et al. (2001)’s framework is rather different in seeking to identify
only outcome measures of social exclusion. They look for indicators which reflect
direct exclusion in one of four domains – consumption, production, political
engagement and social interaction. Poor health and education are seen as factors
which might make exclusion in any of these spheres more likely, but are not seen as
outcome measures in themselves. Indicators in these areas are not examined, and
much more attention than usual is paid to measures of social and political exclusion.
Other studies have used a more extensive set of domains. The Swedish Level
of Living Surveys, for instance, include the five used here plus an additional four:
housing, exposure to crime, political participation and leisure pursuits (Erikson,
1993). In many cases additional variables fit easily into one of the five, and there
seems no strong reason for adding dimensions. Housing is included in this paper
under the material well-being domain and political participation and, to a limited
extent, leisure pursuits are discussed as part of social participation. But exposure to
crime is one area which cannot be slotted in. We might want to add to it measures of
air and water quality (although these could also be included under health), perhaps
in a ‘local environment’ domain. Indeed, both crime levels and pollution are of
particular interest here: as contextual variables they are perfectly suited to a regional
study, while they fit only clumsily (and usually not at all) into individual studies.
But because of the lack of data on either of these, this potential sixth domain is
ignored here for the moment.
What indicators should the EU be collecting to represent the five domains?
The indicators which we might choose if data were no object are discussed within
the relevant sections below. The list here shows the indicators which are in practice
examined in the paper, reflecting the balance between the ideal and the constraints
of data availability.
¾ Material well-being
* Average equivalised household income (Luxembourg Income Study)
* Poverty rate measured against a national poverty line (LIS)
* Poverty rate measured against a region-specific poverty line (LIS)
* Decile ratio (LIS)
* Measure of housing quality (European Community Household Panel)
¾ Participation in productive life
* Unemployment rate (European Labour Force Survey)
* Long-term unemployment rate (European LFS)
* Share of working age adults ‘not in employment’ (European LFS)
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¾ Education
* Share of adult population with ISCED 3 qualifications or below (European
LFS)
* Share of 17 year olds in full-time education (European LFS)
¾ Health
* Infant mortality rate (Eurostat)
* Standardized mortality rate (Eurostat)
* Self-assessed health measure (ECHP)
¾ Social participation
* Club membership (ECHP)
* Social contact with friends, relatives and neighbours (ECHP)
How do these indicators compare to those proposed by the European
Commission and the Atkinson report? The list agreed at Laeken, heavily influenced
by Atkinson et al., included ten ‘primary’ indicators, covering all of the first four
domains (the idea is that ‘secondary’ indicators will cover the same areas but
provide additional depth, detail and robustness checks). Indicators are included for
the distribution of income, poverty incidence and persistence, the poverty gap, long-
term unemployment, jobless households, early school leavers, life expectancy and
self-assessed health. The indicators looked at here include measures for each of these
where data allows; differences are discussed in the relevant sections below.
The main differences not driven simply by data availability are three. First,
the paper includes a measure of housing quality. Housing is put forward in the
Atkinson report as a primary indicator, but has not been incorporated in the final list
agreed on. However, the report on which the Laeken decision is based recommends
that more work be done to develop accurate comparative measures in this area
(Social Protection Committee, 2001). Second, the paper examines indicators intended
to capture some aspects of social participation. This is a domain which both
Atkinson and the Social Protection Committee classify as ‘to be developed’, and
indeed, cross-country disparity in results do support the view that more work is
needed to make indicators in this area truly comparable.
Finally, of course, the paper differs from the Laeken list on the key issue of the
single regional disparity indicator, and this brings us on to the question of how
regional disparity is to be measured here. As we have already seen, the Laeken
decision is to take the coefficient of variation of regional unemployment rates as the
disparity indicator. Atkinson et al. argue that this makes little sense, not just because
it is arbitrary to single out unemployment as the basis for the indicator, but also
because of the problems of comparing the extent of disparities across countries with
differing numbers and sizes of regions (pp.76-7). Taking NUTS1 regions as the unit
of measurement solves the size problem to some degree, as the basic concept of the
region is at least the same in each country; it would clearly be misleading to compare
UK regions with French communes, for example. But it remains true that dispersion
will tend to be less in a country with 3 regions than in a country with 30.
Furthermore, as Atkinson et al. also note, disparities can only be interpreted if they
are examined alongside the national average: ‘a Member State that had a 10 percent
unemployment rate across all regions might score well on consistency, but this can
12
hardly be a performance to be commended’ (p.77). What we want to know is that a
national rate of 5 percent disguises a regional low of 1 percent and a high of 10
percent.
This paper does not compare measures of disparity across countries, but
explores the extent of regional dispersion using maps and graphs. A graph does not
allow for neat rankings of countries by level of dispersion, but does let us size up
two aspects of a country’s performance at once, balancing the average ranking and
the regional dispersion around the average. In most cases the graphs used here also
let us take into account how many regions a country has.
Coefficients of variation are used on occasion in the paper, to compare the
extent of disparity in the same country at different points in time, and to compare
dispersion on different (but similar) indicators. The paper also examines the strength
of correlations between some of the indicators, both across the EU as a whole and
within particular countries, and in places uses regressions to further explore the
links between indicators.
4. Material well-being
There are arguably four aspects of material welfare which a study of regional well-
being must address: average living standards in the region; the level and severity of
poverty; the degree of income inequality; and the quality of housing. Existing data
sources allow us to say something – although not always something very complete
or convincing – about all four of these areas.
Average income
The material welfare of European regions is most commonly proxied using regional
GDP per capita, available from Eurostat right down to NUTS3 level (e.g. European
Commission, 1996; Hills, 1995). Regional GDP is of course of some interest in its own
right as it reflects regional production, but as a measure of regional living standards
it is fairly weak as it fails to take account of the impact of taxes and transfers.
Unfortunately, more accurate sources of regional income data are thin on the
ground. In some countries the census may contain information on incomes; in
others, including the UK, it does not. Census data are in any case not publicly
accessible in many countries. The most promising option is household survey data,
but sample sizes at regional level are frequently too small for calculations to be
treated as robust, as will be discussed further below.
The data I use in this section are all from the Luxembourg Income Study,
which collates and standardises household datasets from a growing number of
countries. All EU member states other than Portugal and Greece are currently
represented in at least one wave. The advantages of using LIS are obvious: all
datasets are gathered in one place and – at least in principle – have been harmonised
to make income definitions comparable. The main disadvantage is that the dataset
included for each country may not always be the one with the greatest regional
possibilities, and there may be something to gain from exploring alternative national
data sources. For instance, in the UK case, the Family Expenditure Survey is
included in LIS, while the newer Family Resources Survey has larger regional
13
samples. (The Family Resources Survey is currently in the process of being ‘Lissified’
and will soon be available through LIS.)
There are also questions about how comparable income definitions really are
across countries. In countries where taxation and spending are higher, post-tax
income will be lower but individuals may bear less responsibility for financing
services such as health and education. In addition, post-tax income fails to reflect the
burden of indirect taxation: countries with a higher share of taxation raised through
consumption taxes will have higher nominal disposable income but also higher
prices. Finally, variations in housing systems will affect results. In countries with
large owner-occupier sectors and/or large social housing sectors, substantial income
in kind from housing ought to be added to the income measure to make it
comparable with income in countries where most people rent privately.
Each of these problems, of course, will affect comparisons of rates of poverty
and inequality as well as comparisons in average income. Gardiner et al. (1995)
investigate the effects on international comparisons of income distribution of
differences in health and housing systems and argue that adjusting for either can
significantly change results. On the other hand, they also argue that only
sophisticated adjustments (which are not always made possible by the data) are
worth making: for instance, examining data for the UK and France, they find that
taking income pre-housing costs produces a better approximation to their ideal than
the crude adjustment of taking income after housing costs.
The income measures used here and for the estimates of poverty and
inequality below are measured prior to housing costs and no attempt is made to
impute in-kind income from either housing or public expenditure. Any straight
comparison of results across countries may be misleading and should not be given
too much weight. However, as our interest here is in disparities within countries,
these issues are of less concern to us than they might be – although the housing
question in particular may still have some impact given very large regional
variations in housing costs in countries such as the UK.
Average income has been calculated by NUTS1 region for all EU countries
included in LIS. For several countries (Spain, France, Italy, Sweden and Finland), LIS
datasets give NUTS2 level regional identifiers, but these have been aggregated here
to NUTS1 level, making results more robust and allowing analysis at the same level
of aggregation as for the UK, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria.
Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg can also be included as single region countries.
(Data are not available for the same years in all countries, however. LIS organises the
data into four ‘waves’, of which the three most recent are used here: Wave 2 around
1985, Wave 3 around 1990 and Wave 4 around 1995.4)
Figure 4.1 shows average household incomes after taxes and transfers by
NUTS1 region for the most recent wave of data, 1994-96, for all EU countries covered
4 Data are available as follows for each country: Belgium 1985, 1992 and 1996;
Denmark 1987 and 1992; Germany 1989 (West Germany) and 1994 (united
Germany); Spain 1980 and 1990; France 1984, 1989 and 1994; Ireland 1987;
Italy 1986, 1991 and 1995; Luxembourg 1985, 1991 and 1994; Netherlands
1987; Austria 1995; Finland 1987, 1991 and 1995; Sweden 1987, 1992 and 1995;
UK 1986, 1991 and 1995.
Figure 4.1: Average household income by region, LIS wave 4 (1995)
5,000
7,000
9,000
11,000
13,000
15,000
17,000
19,000
21,000
23,000
25,000
s
i
c
s
u
d
c
a
m
p
s
a
r
d
a
b
r
u
l
a
z
c
e
n
t
n
e
s
t
n
o
v
e
s
t
l
o
m
b
e
m
i
l
f
i
n
l
a
n
d
s
w
e
d
e
n
s
u
d
o
w
e
s
t
o
o
s
t
o
s
a
c
h
(
e
)
t
h
u
r
(
e
)
m
e
c
k
(
e
)
b
r
a
n
d
(
e
)
s
a
n
h
(
e
)
r
h
e
i
n
n
i
e
d
b
r
e
m
b
e
r
l
b
a
d
e
n
s
c
l
h
a
m
n
o
r
d
b
a
y
e
r
n
h
e
s
s
n
i
r
e
l
w
m
i
d
n
e
a
s
t
s
c
o
t
n
w
e
s
t
e
a
s
t
y
o
r
k
s
w
a
l
e
s
e
m
i
d
s
w
e
s
t
s
e
a
s
t
l
o
n
d
n
o
r
d
o
u
e
s
t
s
u
d
o
u
b
a
s
s
m
e
d
c
e
n
t
r
e
s
t
i
l
e
w
a
l
l
b
r
u
x
f
l
a
n
l
u
x
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
P
P
S
Italy At Germany UK France BeFi Se Lux
NB 1994 data for Germany, France, Luxembourg; 1996 data for Belgium.
14
by this wave.5 The figure is drawn with ‘cat’s whiskers’ showing the 95 percent
confidence intervals for each estimated average. These remind us that in many cases
the size of a regional sample is just too small for us to be certain, or near certain, that
the region is really richer or poorer than its neighbour. In the UK case, for example,
London and the South East are shown to have average household income
significantly higher, and Northern Ireland income significantly lower, than that in
the rest of the country, but confidence intervals for all other regions overlap.6
Table 4.1 gives number of households in the sample by region for each wave
of data, and the differing lengths of the whiskers are immediately explained. Sample
sizes in the LIS datasets are particularly small for Germany, and only slightly larger
for Italy and the UK: in a handful of regions samples fall below 200 households. In
contrast, samples are much larger for the Spanish, French and Austrian regions, and
standard errors are lower as a result. In the Belgian data, samples are large for the
Flanders and Wallonia regions, but very small for Brussels.
In two cases, regions have been merged so as to increase sample size and
produce more robust estimates. The German city-state of Hamburg has been
combined with the surrounding region of Schleswig-Holstein; and Bremen has been
combined with Lower Saxony. In both instances the cities are richer than the
surrounding regions, but are arguably still reasonably similar. In other cases,
however, neighbouring regions are too distinctive for merges to be sensible. Little
would be gained, for example, from combining Brussels with either Flanders or
Wallonia or Northern Ireland with Scotland. Sicily and Sardinia are a more difficult
case: as island regions on Italy’s periphery they bear many similarities, yet the LIS
data shows Sardinia to be significantly better off. It is probably better to have a
rough idea of the position of each island than one averaged result for the two.
Keeping an eye on the whiskers, then, what does Figure 4.1 tell us about the
dispersion of regional incomes in Europe? The larger countries all display
considerable regional disparities, although the range is greatest in Italy. Belgian
regions are clustered towards the upper end of the distribution, with Austrian
regions somewhat behind. Luxembourg, well-known as the richest country in the
5
Incomes have been equivalised using the square root of the number of household members,
following Atkinson et al, 1995. They have then been bottom-coded at 1 percent of equivalised
national mean income and top-coded at 10 times national median non-equivalised income,
following Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997 and Jesuit et al, 2001. This limits the impact of
extreme values at either end of the distribution, reducing standard errors, which is important
given small regional sample sizes. All zero incomes have been dropped as in most of the LIS
data sets it is impossible to distinguish between genuine zero incomes and missing values:
see Atkinson et al, 1995. Finally, incomes were converted from national currencies to a
European Purchasing Power Standard for household final consumption expenditure: see
European Commission, 1994 and 1999.
6
However, these confidence intervals are rather more restrictive than they need to be. We
want to be 95 percent confident that average income in region A is higher than that in region
B. Requiring that the whiskers do not overlap represents the stricter condition of 95 percent
confidence that region A’s average income is higher than a value x and, independently, 95
percent confidence that region B’s average is lower than x. Calculating joint significance tests
is unwieldy as it involves separate calculations for each pair of figures, so the more restrictive
results are presented here.
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EU, turns out to have average household income far higher even than the next
richest region, Ile de France (which contains Paris).
Within countries, income disparities are much as might be expected. Italy
displays a clear north-south divide: the five southern Italian regions are the poorest
in all countries with data available, with Sicily significantly poorer than the rest.
Lazio (the region containing Rome) forms a bridge to the middle incomes of central,
north-east and north-west Italy, with Lombardy (Milan) and Emilia-Romagna off on
their own at the top of the distribution. The Flemish speaking area of Belgium is
significantly richer than the French-speaking area, with Brussels appearing to fall in
the middle, although the very small sample size for Brussels makes this result
questionable. The eastern region of Austria, which includes Vienna, is significantly
richer than the western region, which is in turn slightly richer than the south. In
Germany, the division is broadly speaking an east-west one – although Rheinland-
Pfalz is a West German region which ranks among the East. Beyond this, no single
region stands out as much richer or poorer in Germany: samples are just too small to
allow us to pick up subtleties within either group.
One interesting point is that France and the UK show surprisingly similar
patterns of disparity to each other. In both, we have the rest of the country lagging
well behind the capital and its surrounding area – Ile de France on the one hand and
London and the South-East on the other. Both also have one region which is
significantly poorer than the rest – the Northern region of France and Northern
Ireland in the UK. But in France, the middle group shows some (limited) evidence of
an east-west divide, while in the UK the divide is very roughly north-south
(unfortunately, as for Germany, large standard errors make it difficult to separate
these regions).
These geographical patterns are better illustrated in Map 4.1 which shows
income quintiles for the nine countries with available data. Broadly speaking,
incomes appear to fall with distance from Europe’s centre, with the exception of the
areas surrounding capital cities.
Figures 4.2 and Map 4.2 show the same data for 1990, which allows us to see
how Spanish regions fit into the distribution. The Spanish data display an east-west
division: along with Madrid, north and north-easterly regions are significantly better
off than the centre, south and north-west. But even the richer Spanish regions appear
on a par only with the poorer areas of the Italian south. Map 4.2 includes Spain,
Denmark and the Netherlands but excludes East Germany and Austria: the wealthy
zone now runs clearly down through central Europe, from Denmark through
Germany to Northern Italy, along with Paris, Luxembourg and Southern England.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 in combination let us examine the persistence of within-
country rankings over time (data for 1985 – and for Spain 1980 – are also referred to
though not shown). The divisions down the middle of both Italy and Spain are clear
in both periods. (In Italy the divide seems to have widened, but the 1985 wave of
data belies the impression that this is a continuous trend.) Similarly, the
predominance in the UK of London and the South East and in France of Ile de France
is found in all years, although in both countries the relative position of the poorer
neighbour – Northern Ireland and the North – seems to have gradually worsened
over time: in 1985 neither region was significantly poorer than the rest of the
country. At the top of the distribution, Luxembourg has been gradually extending its
lead.
 
 
Figure 4.2:
Average household income by region, LIS wave 3 (1989-91)
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In Italy, the ordering is also very consistent within the group of poorer regions
(with the exception of Sardinia, for which sample sizes are very small). Sicily is
always at the bottom, followed by the South, Campania and then Abruzzo. Within
the richer group, Lombardy and Emilia Romagna rank persistently top, with the
North East, North West and Central regions following. The North East was
significantly poorer than the latter two in 1985 but seems to have caught up by 1995.
The position of Lazio also changes – significantly richer than all but the top two in
1985, by 1995 it has fallen towards the bottom of the middle group.
Within the poorer Spanish group, the South and Central regions rank
significantly below the North East in both available waves of data.
In France the Central region is consistently richer than the West, Southwest
and Bassin de Paris (as is the Mediterranean, but these differences are not always
significant). There is almost no consistency at all for Germany or the UK, and
ranking of West German regions changes completely between the two waves, while
in the UK the south-west repeatedly takes third place to London and the South East
but the positions of other regions shift around. As already noted, few regional
differences in either country are significant, and these shifting rankings are almost
certainly explained by lack of robustness in the results due to small sample sizes.
It was argued above that average household income data is preferable as a
measure of regional economic welfare to GDP per capita because the latter reflects
the economic situation prior to taxes and transfers. The GDP measure ought to have
the advantage of robustness, however, as it is not based on survey data.7 Figure 4.3
shows both LIS average income data for wave four and regional GDP per capita in
PPP for 1995. The aim is twofold – to check how plausible the income data appears,
and (insofar as it does seem plausible) to explore the extent to which the regional
income distribution post-tax differs from that prior to taxation.
In most cases rankings do not change enormously, but average income is
much more evenly distributed than GDP, as would be expected. In some countries,
equalisation is more effective than in others: Austria and Belgium seem perfect
examples of progressive taxation systems. In the UK, London is doing its bit,
although results for the rest of the country are a little odd. Scotland appears to have
much lower per capita income than the Southeast, as expected, but the same level of
per capita GDP. GDP levels for other regions in the middle of the UK income
distribution support the view that rankings based on the LIS income data are not
accurate for this group. It is also surprising to find very little redistribution from the
Southeast (excluding London) to the rest of the country. In light of these findings,
the UK figures were checked against data for post-tax income provided by the
Inland Revenue Service.8 These suggest that the LIS data substantially underestimate
income for Northern Ireland and the Eastern region, and probably also
underestimate income in Scotland and the West Midlands, while overestimating in
7
GDP data are not immune to measurement problems themselves. Cameron and Muellbauer
(2000) argue that methods of constructing Regional Accounts data for the UK prior to 1995
led to serious biases in the estimations of regional employment income, and hence of regional
GDP: in particular, income for the South East would have been biased downwards. But this
bias had been corrected by 1995 and so should not affect the data presented here.
8
Data taken from the IRS website at www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk.stats.
Figure 4.3:
LIS average regional income 1994-5 and GDP 1995
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Wales and Yorkshire. Further, income may be higher in London relative to the South
East than the LIS data allow. Reordering regions according to IRS figures would iron
out many of the bumps in the UK section of Figure 4.3.
In Germany the greater tax burden paid by the West is clear from the figure,
while in Italy income is being redistributed from North to South. It is striking,
however, that Sicily ends up with much (and significantly) lower per capita income
than the South region or Campania, despite similar levels of GDP per capita.
Similarly, Sardinia has considerably higher GDP than the rest of the south, but the
difference in post-tax income is negligible – in this case, however, the small sample
size for the income data is likely to be to blame.
Poverty
The problems of sample size highlighted above apply even more strongly to
measures of poverty and inequality, which make greater demands on the data.
Ideally, I would examine both a poverty headcount measure and a measure of the
poverty gap in this section. But a regional headcount index alone proves a little too
much for some of the LIS datsets, so for the moment the poverty gap is laid aside. (In
addition to the poverty headcount and the poverty gap, both the Commission and
the Atkinson report propose a measure of poverty persistence, but this requires the
use of panel datasets which are rarely large enough to allow analysis at regional
level.)
Other attempts have been made to compare regional poverty rates using LIS
data. The starting point has been state level analysis for the USA: Rainwater et al.
(2001) compare the child poverty rates of individual states in the US, Canada and
Australia with the national rates of some EU countries. Jesuit et al (2001) extend this
work to include regional breakdowns for France, Italy and Germany, this time
examining overall poverty. However, they use a NUTS2 level breakdown for France
and Italy (merging regions in two or three cases), which exacerbates the sample size
problem, and they find few disparities which can be stated with statistical certainty.
Aggregating regions to NUTS1 level allows us to make some improvements on this.
Before we look at any data we need to decide how to define poverty. While
relative poverty lines are used as standard across Europe, they raise the question,
relative to whom? In particular, recent debate has focused on whether a common EU
poverty line should replace individual national lines (see e.g. Atkinson, 1998; de Vos
and Zaidi, 1998). The EC definition adopted in 1994 plumped explicitly for national
lines, defining the poor as those with ‘resources … so limited as to exclude them
from the minimum acceptable way of life in the member state in which they live’
(Eurostat, 1997, p.3). But some have argued that this definition loses validity as
European integration proceeds, and that there is a growing case for a single EU line.
Here the question is the opposite one: in talking about poverty at regional
level, ought we to move down from a national poverty line to individual regional
lines?9 There are two arguments for this. First, the cost of living varies across regions,
so the resources needed to achieve a given standard of living will differ within a
9
A single EU poverty line could also be applied across regions, of course. This is not done here
so as to keep the paper from growing too large: in the current context, the difference between
poverty rates based on national and regional poverty lines seems the more interesting one.
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country as well as between countries. This will be particularly important when
income is measured prior to housing costs, but housing costs are not the only
variable factor. Second and more fundamental, the set of requirements for
participation may themselves vary. Just as there are ways in which our reference
group is arguably growing outwards from the nation to the wider European
community, in other ways the relevant comparison group is still likely to be our own
town or region. To participate in a ‘minimum acceptable way of life’ we need to be
able to dress, eat and travel in similar ways to our friends and colleagues. We need
to be able to take up an invitation within our own social context and to reciprocate in
kind. Our needs, then, are dependent on the community in which we live. Rainwater
et al. (2001, p.37) take the approach of a regional reference group, arguing that ‘this
brings the definition of a poverty line closer to the social reality of the lives of the
people being studied’. (As Micklewright 2002, p.16 points out, the region or state is
probably far too aggregated a unit for this. But a regional line will still be closer than
a national line.)
At the same time, however, there are other ways in which our reference group
remains very much wider than the region. With the advance of technology we are
more aware of conditions elsewhere: a child growing up in the south of Italy today is
likely not only to see Milanese children on television but to talk to them over the
internet. In addition, there is a strong argument that our reference group coincides
with the level at which policy affecting living standards is made, whether or not we
are affected on a day-to-day level by the situation of other citizens.10 Would it be
acceptable that one section of society could afford to eat only baked beans, as long as
they all lived in the same region and did not know anyone who ate any differently?
As discussed in Section 2, injustice is one of the reasons regional differences are
important.
I would argue that a study of regional well-being needs to include indicators
of poverty measured under both definitions; both on the grounds of multiple
reference groups, and because regional variations in the cost of living cannot easily
be controlled for.11
Figure 4.4 presents 1995 regional poverty rates using a national standard: the
poverty rate is defined as the share of individuals living in households with income
below 60 percent of the national median. The data are presented in the same format
as the household income figures, with cat’s whiskers illustrating the 95 percent
confidence intervals.12 It is immediately clear that LIS data can tell us less about
10
Following this line, we belong to several reference groups at the same time – local, regional,
national and international.
11
An alternative way to deal with the second issue would be to use a regional cost-of-living
index to adjust the poverty line. This is an approach supported by Citro and Michael (1995,
pp.182-201), who call for improvements in data collection to allow it to be done properly for
the US. Borooah et al. (1996) developed such an index for the UK, showing considerable cost
disparities in a number of commodity groups. But for the EU in general, regional cost-of-
living indices do not appear to exist: this does not seem to be an area which Eurostat has
taken up.
12
Bootstrapping has been used to estimate confidence intervals for all poverty and inequality
measures presented (see Efron and Tibshirani, 1993).
Figure 4.4:
Regional poverty rates 1994-5 using a national poverty standard
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regional poverty than about regional average income, but there are still some clear
differences in poverty rates which are statistically significant.
To a large extent, of course, these differences reflect the differences in average
standard of living presented above. In Italy the north-south divide is clear, with
poverty in Sicily in particular higher than in any other region: as many as one in two
Sicilians live on incomes below half the Italian median. Italy also shows the greatest
regional dispersion: poverty rates in the north are among the lowest in Europe,
dropping below ten percent in Emilia-Romagna and Lombardy. It is perhaps
striking just how few of Europe’s regions have poverty rates below this ten percent
level, which is the national rate in Sweden and Finland.
The poorest regions of France and the UK appear to have the highest poverty
rates in both countries, although the UK data in particular suffers from large
standard errors: poverty in Northern Ireland can only be estimated with 95 percent
confidence as between 25 and 45 percent. In these countries, poverty is lowest in Ile
de France and in the South East of the UK. Most UK regions have poverty rates
higher than most French regions, as might be expected from differences in national
rates of poverty.
Belgium shows considerable disparity across its three regions: poverty in the
Flemish-speaking area is significantly lower by several percentage points than in
Brussels or Wallonia. This contrasts with the clustering of the three Austrian regions,
only slightly smaller in size.
The main exception to the rule that average living standards drive regional
poverty rates is Germany, although once again standard errors are too large for this
to be a very solid conclusion. East and West German regions are found at both ends
of the German poverty rankings: in the East, poverty ranges from around 10 percent
in Saxony-Anhalt to around 20 percent in Mecklenburg. This may reflect the ongoing
impact of the socialist inheritance in parts of East Germany. In addition, poverty
appears to be higher in London than in the rest of the South East, reflecting the well-
documented high levels of inequality within the capital.
As a check on the UK figures, they were compared to results from another
source, the Family Resources Survey, which has much larger sample sizes than the
LIS Family Expenditure Survey data (24,000 households for the UK in total, rather
than 7,000). FRS data are for 1995/96 and are taken from Bardgett and Vidler (2000,
p.25). The poverty line used is 50 percent of national mean income, so is different
than the 60 percent of the median used for the LIS calculations. However, DSS (2001)
table 3.11 shows no more than a one percentage point difference between regional
poverty rates measured using these two lines for 1999/00 FRS data. An additional
problem is that the FRS data are for income after housing costs: data from the DSS
source above suggest that this will only make a difference to results for London
(where poverty is much higher after housing costs) and to Wales (where poverty is
somewhat lower once housing costs are taken into account).
The comparison shows a strong correlation between most datapoints in the
two series, with four exceptions. Poverty in London is much higher using the FRS
data, but this reflects the impact of looking at income post-housing costs, as
discussed. The small sample sizes appear to be affecting results for just three regions.
First, poverty in the East seems overestimated – according to FRS data the East has
the second best poverty performance in the UK, just behind the South East. Second,
poverty in Scotland also seems to be overestimated by the LIS data, while in Wales
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the rate is underestimated (a result which we can assume would be stronger were
housing costs treated in the same way in both series). That the re-rankings required
are not more extensive is fairly encouraging, given that the UK is one of the LIS
countries with the most severe sample size problems. We can bear the specific
results in mind when we come to compare regional poverty rankings to performance
on other indicators.
Figure 4.5 shows the poverty rate for the 1990 wave of data, with Spain
included. As for Italy, Spanish poverty rates show the same clear division displayed
by average incomes: the centre and south of the country have poverty rates in the
twenties, while poverty in the North and Northeast regions and Madrid is
significantly lower. Poverty rates in southern Spain appear to be on a par with those
in much of the UK, but are lower than those in parts of southern Italy.
Finally, the low poverty rate for Brussels in this wave compared to the much
higher rate for 1995 suggests that the sample for Brussels is just too small to be of
use.
The pattern of poverty across the EU can be seen in Map 4.3 (Spanish data for
1990 are included). Not surprisingly, this is something of an inverse of the map of
average income presented earlier. Poverty is highest in southern Spain and southern
Italy and in northern England and Scotland, with the lowest rates running down
through western Germany and eastern France to northern Italy, as well as in Paris.
(Remember that no data are available for Portugal or Greece).
How different does the picture of poverty look if poverty is defined against a
region-specific poverty line – 60 percent of regional median income? Unfortunately,
as Figure 4.6 shows, this seems to be asking just a little bit too much of the LIS data.
(Data for Spain for 1990 and for the Netherlands for 1987 are included in the figure.)
For most countries only the extremes stand out: in Italy it is notable that it is the
poorest region, Sicily, which has the highest poverty rate even where a region-
specific poverty line is used. The highest poverty in Spain is in the Canaries, also one
of the poorest regions, but in most countries the opposite is the case, with the richer
regions showing the highest poverty rates on this measure. This is true of London
and the South-East, of Ile de France, of the Vienna region of Austria and of the
Western Netherlands. West German regions for the most part have higher poverty
rates than regions from the former East Germany. (Figure 4.7 shows the same data
ordered by poverty rankings using a national standard to show how regional
rankings change within countries, while Map 4.4 shows the change in the EU-wide
pattern of poverty. Almost all the UK other than Northern Ireland now falls into the
worst quintile, and the poor performance of many of the capital regions is also clear.)
Inequality
Why do we want to measure inequality as well as poverty? While poverty indicators
focus on incomes at the bottom of the distribution, the size of the gap between the
very top and the bottom is also relevant to the well-being of a society. An exclusive
focus on poverty measured using a poverty line based on median income suggests
that the position of the richest is of no concern to anyone else. But the incomes of the
richest influence morale and can distort certain markets, such as the housing market;
while the very rich also opt out of public services with potentially damaging effects.
Figure 4.5: Regional poverty rates 1989-91 using a national poverty standard
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Figure 4.6:
Regional poverty rates 1994-5 using a regional poverty standard
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Figure 4.7: Regional poverty rates 1994-5 using a regional poverty standard (ordered left to right by
regional poverty rates using a national standard)
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‘If the range of income, top to bottom, is soaringly wide… it becomes
impossible for everyone to mix on reasonably equal terms and to have
a sensible share of the normal accoutrements of social life’ (Age
Concern, cited by Barry, 1998, p.1).
If our interest is in the length of the income distribution, the decile ratio
would seem the best choice of inequality indicator, as opposed to a more general
measure such as the Gini, which is more sensitive to change in the middle of the
distribution than at the extremes.
(Atkinson et al. argue in favour of the Commission’s choice of a quintile share
ratio. They support a quintile share ratio as opposed to a quintile ratio on the
grounds that the latter can get worse even when the distribution has become less
unequal; e.g. in the case of a transfer from the person at the top of the bottom
quintile to someone at the bottom. The quintile share ratio is chosen rather than the
decile share ratio because decile shares will be more sensitive to influence by
outliers. But quintile shares are themselves still sensitive to such outliers. In the
regional case, with small sample sizes, the arguments in favour of choosing a share
ratio do not seem strong enough to dislodge the decile ratio.)
The decile ratio is presented in Figure 4.8. Countries are ordered left to right
by national poverty rate, to increase the amount of information conveyed, and
within countries regions are ordered left to right by average household income.
Levels of inequality tend to be higher in countries with higher poverty rates, as
would be expected. But there is a split between countries in which higher income
regions have higher inequality and those in which the opposite is true. In Germany,
the Netherlands, Austria and the UK, the decile ratio tends to rise as regional income
rises; while in Spain and Italy, it is the poorest regions in which inequality is highest.
While standard errors are large, as the figure illustrates, this can be said with
statistical confidence at least for those regions at the extremes of the distribution in
each country.
Finally, it is worth noting that national decile ratios in every country fall
roughly in the middle of the regional spread of decile ratios for that country. This is
not inevitable: if inequality between regions was very high, we might find regional
decile ratios to be lower than national decile ratios. If the richest ten percent of the
UK population all lived in London and the poorest ten percent in Northern Ireland,
for instance, the UK decile ratio would be higher than the ratio for either region on
its own. But in practice, in each country, there are regions where internal inequality
is higher than it is across the country as a whole.
Housing
The last aspect of material well-being which ought to be covered here is the quality
of housing. While in most cases prices for private goods are similar for everyone,
housing is a significant exception. Widely varying housing systems across the EU,
and the differing rents facing occupants of social housing and those in the private
sector even within a country, mean that income may tell us little about the housing
options available to a household. In turn, housing conditions clearly have an
important impact on health, and are likely to affect other aspects of life as well:
overcrowding might be expected to affect children’s education, for instance, as well
as the tranquillity of household relations.
Figure 4.8: Decile ratio by region 1994-5
(countries ordered left to right by national poverty rate; regions ordered left to right by regional average
income)
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Despite their importance and the fact that many countries collect quite
detailed information on housing, the first comparable source of data on housing
conditions has only recently become available. A European Commission publication
on housing from 1993 included a very limited selection of indicators by member
state (and this represents only the very best-case scenario for a regional-level
analysis): the share of owner-occupied dwellings, the share of pre-1919 dwellings,
the share with a bath or shower and the share with central heating (European
Commission, 1993). Since then, the European Community Household Panel (ECHP)
has increased the possibilities for cross-national study: the panel includes a series of
questions on housing conditions including overcrowding, the presence of a number
of basic amenities, adequate heating facilities and the existence of damp and rot.
The ECHP contains NUTS1 level breakdowns for all countries except
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden (no data at all are available for Sweden).
Household sample sizes are provided in Table 4.2, which shows that samples tend to
be smaller than in the LIS datasets. However, questions about housing conditions
require a simple yes/no response, (‘Do you have any of the following problems with
your accommodation?’), and aggregating these responses to regional level is much
less demanding of the data than the calculation of average equivalised household
income.
Figure 4.9 presents the share of households by region reporting three or more
of a list of six housing problems: no indoor toilet; no hot running water; shortage of
space; a leaky roof; pollution, grime or other environmental problems; and crime or
vandalism in the area. Countries and regions are ordered left to right by poverty rate
(lowest to highest). Housing conditions are clearly worst in Portugal and Greece.
Within several countries there is a broad but imperfect correlation between the rate
of regional income poverty and the extent of housing problems, although this does
not hold for France or the UK. Re-ranking the UK regions according to FRS data, as
discussed above, would improve the correlation, shifting Scotland and the East to
the left and Wales to the right. But the poorest UK region, Northern Ireland, appears
to have the second lowest level of housing problems in Europe, with less than two
percent of households suffering three of the six problems, only just ahead of the East,
where less than one percent of households are sufferers.
5. Productive life
The intention in this section is to reflect the sense of worth and well-being which
comes with useful activity, rather than to focus on the financial benefits of
employment: the latter are covered by the material well-being indicators discussed
above. There is therefore no reason why productive activity should be identified
exclusively with paid employment, excluding voluntary work and unpaid care. At
the same time, the quality of paid employment is also relevant: the share of jobs
which are tedious and unfulfilling should be reflected.
What we really want, then, is a survey question along the lines of ‘How
fulfilling do you find your main activity?’ In its absence, the rate of unemployment
seems a disappointing but safe best option. This will exclude those in unhappy jobs,
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Figure 4.9
Share of households in housing that suffers from three or more out of six problems (ECHP 1996)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
n
e
t
h
s
l
u
x
f
i
n
l
a
n
d
g
e
r
m
a
n
y
f
l
a
n
w
a
l
l
b
r
u
x
i
l
e
e
s
t
c
e
n
t
r
b
a
s
s
o
u
e
s
t
m
e
d
s
u
d
o
u
n
o
r
d
d
e
n
m
a
r
k
w
e
s
t
o
o
s
t
o
s
u
d
o
n
o
r
e
s
t
e
m
a
d
r
i
d
e
s
t
e
n
o
r
o
e
s
t
e
c
e
n
t
r
o
c
a
n
a
r
i
a
s
s
u
r
i
r
e
l
a
n
d
e
m
i
l
l
o
m
b
c
e
n
t
n
o
v
e
s
t
n
e
s
t
l
a
z
a
b
r
u
s
a
r
d
c
a
m
p
s
u
d
s
i
c
s
w
e
s
t
s
e
a
s
t
e
m
i
d
w
a
l
e
s
e
a
s
t
w
m
i
d
n
w
e
s
t
y
o
r
k
s
s
c
o
t
n
o
r
t
h
n
i
r
e
l
v
o
r
e
i
a
k
e
n
t
r
i
k
i
a
t
t
i
k
i
n
i
s
i
a
p
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
Notes: (1) Countries are ordered by national poverty rates (lowest to highest); and regions are ranked in the same way except for Greece, where no data are available.
(2) The six housing problems are: no indoor toilet; no hot running water; shortage of space (subjective response); leaky roof; pollution, grime or other environmental problems;
and crime or vandalism in the area.
23
and this seems inevitable, but it does also make sure that we exclude those happily
engaged in non-labour market activity.
Counting only the unemployed as not in productive work excludes an
additional group, however, which we can go some way towards identifying – those
who would like to work but are excluded from the labour force, either due to illness,
or because they have excluded themselves (perhaps retiring early) because few jobs
are available. The size of this group is likely to vary across countries, across regions
and over time, making it important to pick them up. In the UK, for instance, the
numbers of people claiming benefit for long-term sickness or invalidity rose steadily
through the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s (see e.g. Beatty and Fothergill, 1999,
p.9). How far this reflects a genuine rise in long term disability and how far it is due
instead to a reclassification of some benefit recipients (as Beatty and Fothergill
propose) is irrelevant in the current context. Either way, those affected are neither
officially unemployed nor participating, as far as we can tell, in productive activity.
Alongside the rates of unemployment and long term unemployment,
therefore, this section examines a ‘not-in-work’ indicator, calculated as the total
working-age population (in or out of the labour force) less those in paid
employment. This indicator immediately raises other difficulties – we have taken
care above to ensure that unpaid care-givers, for instance, do not classify as without
productive activity, yet here they are suddenly thrown in as such. The problem
might be thought of as one of Type I and Type II error: either we include as not-in-
work some people who should not be there, or we exclude some who should be. As
there is no way to get the perfect measure using the available data, we look at
measures which err on both sides.
It should be clarified at this point that the data used here are from the
European Community Labour Force Survey. Access to the raw LFS data is not
permitted under confidentiality rules, so we are limited to results made available
through the Eurostat New Cronos Database and through various print
publications.13 This prevents us from exploiting the data’s full potential. For instance,
printed results from the 1999 LFS allow us to identify reasons for inactivity by
region, including categories for ‘inactive due to illness’, ‘inactive due to family
responsibility’, ‘inactive in retirement’, ‘inactive in education’ and ‘inactive thinking
no work’ (Eurostat, 2000a, Table 66). This looks to be just what we need, but all data
are given for the total inactive population of all ages, meaning that any differences
across regions or countries could be explained simply by differences in the age
structure of the population. A similar breakdown for the population aged 25-59
would be ideal.
The raw data could also be used to calculate alternative indicators which are
not provided in published sources. In particular, the proportion of individuals living
in households where no member is in work is an important measure of well-being,
not just as a strong predictor of poverty (for which we have a separate indicator) but
also because the absence of any links at all to the labour market is likely to
exacerbate the extent to which members of a household feel dispensable. It may also
affect the aspirations of any children in the house. The share of the population living
in jobless households is put forward by both the Commission and the Atkinson
13
It is possible to request the extraction of particular tables, which are provided for a fee.
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report as a key exclusion indicator, alongside the unemployment and long-term
unemployment rates, but it is not available at regional level in published data.14
Unemployment and long-term unemployment
Figure 5.1 shows national and NUTS1 level unemployment rates for 1997.15
(Unemployment is measured according to the ILO definition.) Unemployment
varied from 2.5 percent in Luxembourg to 30 percent in the southern region of Spain.
High unemployment is found right across Spain: only in East Germany and
Southern Italy are rates as high, with unemployment in the North and
Mediterranean regions of France also above the 15 percent mark and higher than the
Spanish North-East.
It is of little surprise to find that unemployment rates are in general strongly
negatively correlated with average incomes and positively correlated with poverty
rates as discussed in Section 4, although there are exceptions. Unemployment shows
a clear North-South divide in Italy, with rates ranging from just 5-6 percent in the
North-East, Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna to 25 percent in Campania and Sicily;
rates in all the former East German regions are above 17 percent, compared to
between 5 and 12 percent in the West (Berlin falls in the middle at 13 percent). The
South has the lowest average income and among the highest poverty rates in Spain,
although the Canaries and Central region have similar rates of poverty and much
lower unemployment.
In France, however, while the North ranks as the lowest income, highest
poverty region, the Mediterranean falls in the middle of the income distribution
despite high levels of unemployment. And in the UK, unemployment is highest in
the North-East but second highest in London – although overall levels of
unemployment are relatively low in the UK, and regional disparities are the lowest
of any of the larger EU countries.
In both Belgium and Greece unemployment is also higher in the capital or
capital region: in Brussels the rate is 13 percent, similar to Wallonia but twice as high
as in Flanders. Nearly 12 percent are unemployed in the Athens region of Attiki,
compared to less than 5 percent in Nisia Aigaiou, which covers the Greek islands.
Figure 5.2 plots the unemployment rate against the share of the unemployed
who have been out of work for at least twelve months. Only five countries are
shown for reasons of clarity; all other countries are found in the centre of the figure.
Between 30 and 60 percent of the unemployed are long-term unemployed in most
regions, although the Italian south and Lazio stand out at the higher end, with
upwards of 70 percent out of work for more than a year.
We might expect the share of the long term unemployed to be higher in high
unemployment regions, and this is true for some countries, such as Italy, but not all.
14
More precisely, the Commission proposes the long-term unemployment rate and the share of
jobless households; while the Atkinson report puts forward the unemployment rate, long-
term unemployment rate and the share of individuals living in jobless households.
15
Sample sizes in the European LFS are far larger than in the LIS datasets used in Section 4, and
so no confidence intervals are needed here: samples contain upwards of 10,000 households
per region in most countries, with the exception of the UK, where samples are closer to 5,000
households (European Commission, 1996a).
Figure 5.1: Unemployment rates 1997
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Figure 5.2: Unemployment and long term unemployment 1997
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Spain and Germany in particular show little relation between the two indicators. In
Austria, very low regional disparity in unemployment is found to disguise
substantial differences in the nature of unemployment: almost half of the
unemployed in Eastern Austria (including Vienna) have been out of work for more
than a year compared to 14 percent in the west. The same is true of the UK: 60
percent are long-term unemployed in Northern Ireland, compared to 30 to 40
percent in the rest of the UK.
The ‘not-in-work’ rate
Figure 5.3 shows the percentage of males aged 25-64 who are not in work – the male
‘not-in-work’ rate. The male rate is likely to be a more reliable indicator than the
female rate, in part because of the lower likelihood of a Type II error of the kind
outlined above (fewer men than women work as unpaid carers), and in part because
of the eccentricities of the Eurostat data, as explained in the footnote below.16
The relationship between the not-in-work rate and the unemployment rate is
strongly positive: correlations by country vary between 0.85 and 0.99 with the
exception of Austria (0.75) and Greece, to which we return below.
However, in almost all cases the degree of regional disparity is lower for the
not-in-work rate than for the unemployment rate, using a mean-independent
measure of dispersion such as the coefficient of variation; something which may not
be immediately obvious from a comparison of Figures 5.1 and 5.3. This appears to be
because, while not-in-work rates are almost universally higher than unemployment
rates, the difference tends to be greater in low unemployment regions. In Southern
Italy, for instance, unemployment is at 20-25 percent and the share of men not in
work at 30 to 35 percent; while in the north the unemployment rate lies between 5
and 10 percent and the not-in-work rate at 25 percent.
In the UK, the difference between top- and bottom-ranking regions is nearly
twofold for both series. More than 27 percent of working age men in the North-East,
Wales and Northern Ireland are without work, compared to 16-17 percent in the
16
The ‘not-in-work’ rate is calculated in principle as the sum of the inactive population and the
unemployed population over the total population of working age. But there are a few
complications imposed by the data. First, Eurostat give the active population in ten year
breakdowns only, allowing us to take the active population of either 25-54 or 25-64, but not
25-60. For men it makes sense to use the population of 25-64 and for women the population of
25-54, because of the earlier retirement age for women in most countries. Second, for both
genders the unemployment rate is only available for the population of 25 plus, with no
further breakdown. Hence for women the not-in-work rate can only be calculated as:
( ) iiii POPupUNEMPINACTIVEWNIW 5425/255425 −+−=
and for men as:
( ) iiii POPupUNEMPINACTIVEMNIW 6425/256425 −+−=
Thus the female not-in-work rate will be overestimated by the number of unemployed
women of 55 plus and the male rate by the number of unemployed men of 65 plus. There
should be few men in the latter category, and the male rate should hence be a more reliable
estimate.
Figure 5.3: Male not-in-work rate 1997 (men 25-64)
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East, the South-West and South-East. (The not-in-work rate cannot be calcuated for
London separately.)
In Germany, regional dispersion is considerably lower and the east-west
divide less sharp than for unemployment: Berlin, Bremen and Saarland have not-in-
work rates as high as all but the top two East German regions. In France, the not-in-
work rate is considerably higher in the Mediterranean region than in the North,
areas with very similar rates of unemployment, but this could reflect a high number
of people taking early retirement to this area.
The real surprise, however, is Greece, where the coefficient of variation is
much higher for the not-in-work rate (the only country where this is the case) and
where the correlation between the two series is negative. Not-in-work rates vary
from 10 percent in Attiki (with the highest unemployment) to 40 percent in the
central region of Kentriki. There appears to be significant hidden unemployment in
parts of Greece, suggesting that the unemployment rate may be misleading as an
indicator.
Cyclical changes in unemployment
This section has concentrated so far on a single point in time, and has not discussed
the stability of either regional rankings or the degree of dispersion over time.
Regional rankings tend to persist, at least in the medium-term, and do not jump
about from year to year. But it is worth pointing out that regional unemployment
disparities do have a strong cyclical element: during a boom, employment tends to
take off faster in areas which had lower unemployment to begin with, leaving other
regions further behind. Figure 5.4 illustrates, showing national average
unemployment and the NUTS2 coefficient of variation over the last decade for three
countries. (Coefficients of variation have been calculated using regional population
weights.) In both Sweden and the UK, there is a strong negative correlation between
unemployment and regional disparities.17 Belgium, Spain, Greece, Portugal and
Finland would have made equally good examples – all have negative correlations of
over 0.50. The case of France shows that this relationship does not hold everywhere:
the rise in overall unemployment during the 1990s has not affected regional
disparities. However, changes in unemployment have been small in France, and
regional disparities were low to begin with.
The implication is that, where certain indicators are concerned, care needs to
be taken in interpreting differences in regional measures of dispersion over time as
well as across countries. Low regional unemployment disparities may simply reflect
recession. This is of particular interest given that the coefficient of variation of
regional unemployment rates has now been officially adopted as the indicator to be
used to reflect the regional dimension of social inclusion.
17
Because of missing data, coefficients of variation for Sweden are calculated using six regions
between 1990 and 1996 and eight regions in 1997 and 1998. For the UK, 29 regions are used
between 1987 and 1994 (excluding London, Wales and Scotland) and 37 regions between 1995
and 1998. In both cases, the inclusion of the missing regions makes only a negligible
difference to the results. For France, 22 regions are used in all years.
Figure
5
.4
:
N
atio
nal
u
n
e
m
ploym
e
nt
a
nd
regional
co
efficients
of
va
riation
fo
r
u
n
e
m
ploym
e
ntin
th
re
e
EU
co
u
ntries
U
K
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
nationalrate
cv
C
orrelation
coefficient=
-0.65
Sw
ed
e
n
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
unempl (%)
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
regional CV
national
rate
cv
C
orrelation
coefficient=
-0.80
Fra
n
c
e
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
unempl (%)
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
regional CV
national
rate
cv
C
orrelation
coefficient=
0.09
27
6. Education
We are looking here for an indicator which picks up the true benefits of education –
what people gain from education which enables them to make the most of future
opportunities in the labour market and in their social, political and cultural lives. In
other words, we want outcome indicators – what do people know, what skills do
they have – rather than what might be thought of as input indicators (education
expenditure) or process indicators (how many people sit through each level of
education).
In the absence of alternatives, it is the latter two types of measure which have
been used most frequently to compare the performance of education systems across
countries. In the last five years there have been a series of surveys which begin to
address the gap, aiming to measure learning achievement and literacy skills in ways
which are internationally comparable. In 1995 and again in 1999 the Third
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS; Beaton et al 1996 and 1996a)
tested school-children in over 50 countries on proficiency in maths and science.
Between 1994 and 1998 the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS; OECD 1995,
1997 and 2000) assessed ‘functional literacy’ among adults aged 16 and over in up to
21 countries, where this covered (for example) the ability to read and understand
instructions on a medicine bottle and to interpret a railway timetable. The OECD’s
PISA survey (Programme of International Student Assessment), carried out in 2000,
is in effect a young people’s version of IALS, assessing 15 year olds in 32 countries
on ‘preparedness for adult life’, including maths, science and reading skills (OECD
2000a).
There are a number of comparability questions surrounding each one of these
studies, but in any case, neither TIMSS nor IALS include samples large enough to
allow regional analysis. (TIMSS samples average 3750 per country; IALS 3400). In the
PISA study (for which data are not yet available for analysis), only Germany and the
UK have explicitly stratified by region, although regional estimates may be possible
in some other countries: samples vary between 5,000 and 7,000 (Andreas Schleicher,
personal communication).
We are thus pushed back to process indicators. The first indicator examined
here is the share of the population aged 25 to 59 who have completed at least upper
secondary education (ISCED level 3). This might be thought of as second best in
more ways than one. First, as noted, it does not tell us what people have gained from
their education, though there is clearly likely to be a strong relation between staying
on in school and literacy and other skills. The final report on the IALS project shows
a correlation in every country between educational attainment and literacy
proficiency – and of course it would be rather disturbing if this were not the case
(OECD, 2000, Figure 2.4; and see also Denny et al, 2000, Table 3 for more detail on
the UK and Ireland). But the correlation is far from perfect, which is also not
surprising – for one thing, ISCED level does not reflect additional learning such as
adult literacy classes taken later in life.
A second and related issue which arises when using ISCED levels is how
comparable the levels really are across countries. This is the main factor driving the
particular choice of ISCED 3 as the cut-off point: it seems to avoid more of the cross-
national consistency problems than other options might. The range of qualifications
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covered by the ISCED 3 umbrella is enormous – in the UK some will complete a one
year vocational course while others will do A levels and go on to university. But in
most EU countries it is not compulsory to complete upper secondary education, so
all those with ISCED 3 qualifications will have made a choice to continue in
education.18 This seems a clearer dividing line to choose than the line between school
and university, as the distinction between certain vocational upper secondary
qualifications in some countries and tertiary qualifications in others may be
unjustified.
In practice, there do seem to be large differences in employment probabilities
across EU countries between individuals with no higher than ISCED 2 qualifications
and those with ISCED 3 (Steedman and McIntosh 2001, p.567). Furthermore,
completion of ISCED 3 appears to be the best choice across countries if we are trying
to proxy literacy. OECD 2000, figure 2.4 shows that for most countries the literacy
gap between those who complete upper secondary education and those who do not
is considerably larger than the gap between those completing upper secondary and
those completing tertiary. Steedman and McIntosh finish their study of the
usefulness of the ISCED framework by concluding that ‘for adults, ISCED 2 [i.e.,
non-completion of ISCED 3] is a reliable measure of attainment across EU countries’
(p.580).
The third problem with the indicator is that it covers the whole adult
population: some of the people included would have made the decision about
whether or not to stay on in school in 1954. To an extent, of course, their situation is
still highly relevant (although, as noted, some may since have enhanced their
learning if not their formal qualifications). We are not interested only in the well-
being of the young. But as a policy-related indicator it is not very helpful, as it will
give us a misleading picture of how regions are performing today. Some regions
may still be similarly positioned, but in others things are likely to have changed
dramatically, with many more young people staying on in education than their
parents and grandparents did. A measure covering the whole population will also
be affected by the nature of adult immigration to the region: regions with a high
concentration of graduate jobs (such as those containing capital cities) will have
much higher levels of ISCED 3 attainment simply because graduates are attracted to
the area. A better indicator, then, would cover just young people, perhaps those in
their late teens or early twenties. Indeed, the education measure proposed by
Atkinson et al. and included in the Laeken list is the share of those aged 18-24 who
have not completed ISCED 3 and are not in education or training leading to an
equivalent qualification.
This is not out of the question for a regional analysis: the data used here are
from the European Union Labour Force Survey and breakdown by more detailed
age groups is possible in principle. For example, figure E12 in European
Commission (2000) provides the data at national level for 22 year olds. As noted
above, the extraction of particular tables of data from the LFS can be requested for a
fee. But this paper relies on the data which are publicly available, supplementing
them with a second indicator which should reflect very much the same thing – the
18
In Belgium and Germany it is compulsory to continue at least part-time in education until the
age of 18. (European Commission, 2000, p.17).
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proportion of 17 year olds in education or training in 1995/96 (Eurostat, 1999, Table
H1). The main disadvantage of this is that it is not available for Belgium, France,
Italy, Greece or the Netherlands at NUTS1 level, and not all at NUTS2.
Figure 6.1 shows the share of the population aged 25-59 who had at least
ISCED level 3 qualifications in 1997. The figure gives the national average for each
country along with the best and worst performances at NUTS1 level. (The x-axis
reminds us of the number of regions in each country.) Disparities are very low in
several of the smaller countries, but the four regions of Greece differ dramatically:
only 35 percent of adults in Kentriki had completed secondary education, compared
to 63 percent in Attiki (the Athens region), better than the best performance in half
the remaining member states. (This fits with the relative levels of GDP per capita in
these two regions, and also with the not-in-work rates discussed above. Four times
as many working age men are without work in Kentriki as in Attiki). In Spain and
Italy the overall numbers are lower, but the dispersion a little less. In Spain, the
pattern strongly reflects that seen above in the discussion of income disparities: the
worst performances are in the south and central regions and the Canary Islands, and
the best in the East, North-East and Madrid, with the North-West falling in the
middle. In Italy, there are a few changes to the picture. Sardinia, Sicily, Campania
and the South have the lowest shares with completed ISCED 3, and Emilia-Romagna
and Lombardy rank towards the top, but the highest share is in Lazio, reflecting the
concentration of government jobs in Rome. In addition, the North-East, North-West
and Central regions all rank below the significantly poorer region of Abruzzo-
Molise, although the differences in education level are only a few percentage points.
In the UK and France, disparities are somewhat smaller and the overall levels
higher. Disparities do not fit any clear pattern. The best performances are in Scotland
and the South West, where around 60 percent of the population have completed
upper secondary education, and the worst in the West Midlands and Wales with 50
percent. In the rest of the country the share hardly varies, falling between 53 and 56
percent. Performance in France is lowest in the poorest region, the North, but the
South-West beats Ile de France and the Centre-East into second place.
Given that it is compulsory in Germany to contiune with some form of
education until at least the age of 18, it is no surprise that German regions rank top
on ISCED 3 qualifications: even the bottom-ranking region, Bremen, does better than
any other NUTS1 region in Europe besides Denmark. The German results show a
clear East-West split – but this time it is the East German regions with the stronger
performance.
But how accurately does this picture reflect the situation of younger
generations? Figure 6.2 is a scatterplot of the ISCED 3 variable for the 25-59 age
group against the share of 17 year olds who were in full time education in 1995/6,
for all countries for which data are available. For all regions outside East Germany,
the share of 17 year olds in education is higher than the share of adults with
completed upper secondary, as expected. Following on from this, the dispersion
across the EU has fallen as regions push up against the ceiling of full enrolment.
Participation among 17 year olds ranges from 60 to 100 percent, compared to ISCED
3 shares ranging from 30 to 95 percent.
Dispersion has not fallen within each individual country, however. In
Germany, the western regions have caught up with (and in some cases overtaken)
the East. But in the UK, the distribution has been stretched as the performance of
Figure 6.1: Share of population 25-59 with completed upper secondary education (ISCED 3) 1997
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Figure 6.2: Educational attainment of general population, and share of 17 year olds in school,
mid 1990s
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some regions outstrips that of others. Northern Ireland now ranks joint top with
Scotland, with 83 percent of 17 year olds in education; while the West Midlands,
which has the lowest share of adults with ISCED 3 qualifications, is now in third
place in front of the South East. In contrast, the South West has fallen to the middle
of the rankings, and Wales is still close to the bottom, just ahead of Yorkshire and
Humberside with 61 percent. So 22 percentage points divide the UK regions on the
youth education indicators, compared to just 12 percent on the adult measure.
In Spain, the distribution has neither widened nor narrowed significantly.
Madrid and the Northeast are still well ahead of the rest, but the Northwest is
catching up while the East has dropped well behind.
National rankings have also shifted about: in particular, the UK’s relative
position has seriously deteriorated, although the degree to which this has happened
is overstated by the figure: it so happens that of all the countries ranked below the
UK in Figure 6.1, data on 17 year old participation rates are only available for Ireland
and Spain. However, both these countries appear to be catching up rapidly with
northern Europe, overtaking the UK as they go. Belgium, the Netherlands, France
and Finland have all caught up with Germany, Denmark and Austria, but we are
unable to say anything about internal disparities in the youth variable in these
countries.
7. Health
Ideally, a combination of mortality and morbidity indicators would be used to
measure regional health, but comparable morbidity statistics are hard to come by.
No EU wide source of information on morbidity at regional level exists, although
national health surveys may allow for analysis at the level of the health authority: by
combining several years of data this can be done for the Health Survey of England,
for instance (see Bajekal, 1999). But even if similar health surveys exist for other EU
countries, differences in methodology may make cross-country comparability of the
results problematic.
However, the ECHP contains a series of questions on self-assessed health
status (e.g. ‘How is your health in general?). Responses to these questions are used in
this section as a complement to mortality indicators.
Mortality Indicators
Two mortality indicators are examined – the infant mortality rate (IMR) and the
standardised mortality ratio (SMR). The infant mortality rate, measuring deaths in
the first year of life, reflects the quality of two factors important to health more
widely – primary health care and nutrition (in this case among pregnant women).19 It
is not a problem which has been wiped out in the EU: while even the highest
European levels of IMR are negligible compared to those in poorer parts of the
world, they still represent thousands of unnecessary deaths a year. If all EU
19
A wide medical literature discusses the relation between maternal nutrition and pregnancy
outcomes in industrialised countries today: see e.g. Scholl and Johnson (2000); Doyle et al
(2000).
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countries had had the same under-5 mortality rate as Sweden in 1995, there would
have been 10,000 fewer deaths in that year (Micklewright and Stewart, 2000, p.30).
The standardised mortality ratio gives an overall mortality measure which
takes account of differences in the age structure of populations in different regions.
Life expectancy at birth is the more standard measure used, and is the indicator
adopted at Laeken, but it is not available by region, while the SMR can be calculated
from Eurostat raw mortality data.20 The SMR provides in any case a fairly good
proxy for life expectancy.21 Deaths from all causes taken together (and to both
genders) are looked at here, but Eurostat data could be used to examine differences
in SMRs from specific causes and with breakdown by gender. The data could also be
used to look at age-specific mortality rates, allowing us to examine the contribution
to regional inequality of differing mortality at particular ages. (In a study of regional
mortality differentials in the UK, Illsley et al (1991) show how patterns of change in
age-specific death rates are disguised by the SMR.) However, while it may fail to
exploit all the information on offer, for present purposes it makes sense to use a
single summary indicator.
Figure 7.1 presents data for both the IMR in 1997 and the SMR in 1998. In both
cases countries are ranked from left to right by per capita GDP in 1997, and national
average mortality is given along with the NUTS1 extremes for each country. IMR
averages appear more closely related to GDP than the figures for SMR, and in
general show a lower level of regional disparity. France is the extreme case, with
particularly low disparity in levels of IMR alongside quite high disparity in the SMR;
while Italy stands out as the exception, with very high IMR inequality. The SMR
averages for several of the low GDP countries are below those for the richer group,
but Portugal and the UK are the exceptions here, with higher average SMR than
their neighbours in the figure. Finally, regional disparities in both indicators tend to
be higher among the countries with lower GDP. (It is worth noting, though, that
GDP rankings have changed considerably over the last decade, and any relationship
between GDP and either of these indicators is likely to be lagged. At national level,
GDP in 1985 is much more strongly correlated with mortality in the late 1990s than is
GDP in 1997: -0.76 against –0.48 for IMR 1997, and –0.49 against -0.01 for SMR
1998.22)
Within countries, how do these indicators relate to one other and to income?
Figure 7.2 shows regional IMR and SMR, with countries ordered left to right by 1997
GDP per capita (low to high); within countries regions are ordered by LIS income
20
Standardisation has been carried out by the author using the indirect method (see Armitage
and Berry, 1994, p.437), with deaths and populations grouped as follows: 0-14, 15-24, 25-34,
35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, 75-84, 85 plus. (Both deaths and population data are taken from
Eurostat New Cronos Database.) Deaths are standardised to the 1998 EU death rates,
although German data are incomplete and not included, while 1996 data are used for Italy
and 1997 data for Austria and France.
21
At national level, the weighted correlation between the standardised mortality rate and life
expectancy at birth for EU countries is –0.85.
22
Transformation into logs makes negligible difference to this result.
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Figure 7.2: IMR 1997 and SMR 1998, ordered by GDP and average household income
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data for the most recent available wave (Spain 1990, Netherlands 1985, all others
1994/5). Greek data is ordered by regional per capita GDP in 1995.
Data for Greece are unusual in that the SMR appears to rise (broadly
speaking) with GDP. The SMR is highest in the Athens region of Attiki, and IMR in
Attiki is also high. Results for the Kentriki region are particularly striking: Kentriki
has the fourth highest infant mortality rate of all European regions shown in the
figure, but the third lowest standardised mortality ratio.
Elsewhere, both IMR and SMR appear broadly correlated with income, as
expected, but in both cases certain regions stand out. Often, these regions do
particularly well or badly on just one of the indicators, not on both. In Spain, the
Central region has lower SMR (but not lower IMR) than income would predict,
while the North-East has a relatively low SMR but the highest infant mortality in the
country, considerably higher than either the East or Madrid, both with similar
average income and similar poverty rates. In France, regional disparity in the SMR is
much higher than for infant mortality, driven in particular by a very high relative
rate in the North and a low rate in Ile de France. But Ile de France has the highest
infant mortality rate in the country, while the lowest rate is found in the South-West,
relatively poor according to the LIS data. Indeed, the French South-West has the
second lowest IMR of all regions represented in the figure.
For the UK, it should be remembered that regional rankings are far from
robust, given the large standard errors in the UK income data: in particular, the
East’s rightful position in the regional income distribution could be several positions
to the right. This said, it still has a good record (by UK standards) on infant
mortality. Northern Ireland, the North-East and Scotland all also perform well on
infant mortality compared to the West Midlands, the North-West and Yorkshire.
After Sicily, the West Midlands has the highest IMR of any region in the figure.
In Italy, the North-West and Emilia-Romagna both show surprisingly high
levels of infant mortality, higher than anywhere in Italy but Sicily and Campania.
SMR in the North-West is also higher than in either the South region or Sardinia.
Indeed, these are the first indicators looked at in the paper in which the north-south
divide is not clear-cut. With the exception of Sicily and Campania, the SMR shows
very low regional disparity.
German regions show a strong east-west divide for SMR, but no such divide
for infant mortality, reflecting the lasting impact of policies promoting early
childhood health in the socialist bloc. In Belgium, Wallonia shows much higher SMR
than the rest of the country, but disparities in both indicators in Austria and the
Netherlands are fairly low – as is regional income disparity.
That the infant mortality rate appears scarcely more closely related to income
within a country than the SMR is perhaps surprising: the factors driving overall
mortality are clearly complex, but we might expect infant mortality to be quite
closely related to poverty. Figure 7.3 underlines the extent to which this is not the
case, showing the relationship between the rate of poverty in a region and that
region’s infant mortality rate for the five largest EU countries. Figure 7.4 presents the
regional poverty rate and the SMR for the same countries, showing that if anything it
is the latter relationship which is closer.
However, one might expect both average income and the level of poverty to
have a role in explaining mortality indicators. To assess the role of each when
controlling for the other, a series of regressions were run with first the SMR and then
Figure 7.3: Regional poverty rates 1994-5 and IMR 1997
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Figure 7.4: Regional poverty rates 1994-5 and SMR 1997
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the IMR as the dependent variable. At the same time, this allowed us to explore
(albeit briefly and superficially) one of the more controversial questions in research
on mortality in the industrialised world today. Wilkinson (1992 and 1996)
hypothesised a relationship between the level of inequality in a society and the rate of
mortality, over and above the links between income and mortality. Does the
Wilkinson hypothesis appears to hold for regional data?
The SMR was regressed on four potential explanatory variables, both alone
and in each possible combination: average household income; the decile ratio; the
poverty headcount measured against a standard of 60 percent of median national
income (Poverty N); and the poverty headcount measured against a standard of 60
percent of median regional income (Poverty R). Grouping all countries together and
with no country dummies, Poverty N was the only significant explanatory factor,
alone explaining 15 percent of variation in the SMR.23 With country dummies
included, average income was the strongest factor: together with the dummies, 63
percent of the variation was explained (the dummies alone explain 42 percent).24
Taking the larger countries separately, results are not always similar. In
general, there is strong multicollinearity between the average income variable and
Poverty N, so both together explain nothing. Average income is usually the stronger
of the two. Poverty R tends to be insignificant, while the role of the decile ratio
varies.
For France, average income alone explains 35 percent of the variation, and the
decile ratio adds nothing. But for the UK and Germany, the best models include
average income and the decile variable. In the UK, average income alone explains
about 45 percent of variation in the SMR and the decile ratio an additional 10
percent. In Germany, average income alone explains about 75 percent of variation,
with the decile ratio explaining an extra 15 percent. However, in the German case the
sign on the decile variable is negative – lower inequality is associated with higher
mortality (the effect, no doubt, of lower levels of inequality in the East German
states).25
For Italy, the decile ratio alone is easily the best explanatory factor, explaining
46 percent of the variation, where average income explains 20 percent and Poverty N
30 percent. (There are very high levels of correlation between all three variables in
the Italian case.) Finally, for Spain the decile ratio is the only significant variable,
explaining 30 percent of variation (although even this is only significant at the 10
percent level).26
23
N=57 in these regressions. The coefficient on the poverty variable was 0.48 (standard error
0.15).
24
Coefficient on average income –0.0027 (standard error 0.0005).
25
In the French regression, N=8, average income coefficient –0.0031 (s.e. 0.0014); for the UK,
N=12, average income coefficient –0.0074 (0.0020) and decile ratio 11.16 (6.09); for Germany
N=9 (several missing data points), average income coefficient –0.0039 (0.0007) and decile ratio
–6.52 (1.95).
26
For Italy, N=11, coefficient on the decile ratio 5.20 (s.e. 1.69); for Spain, N=7, coefficient on the
decile ratio 17.82 (9.38).
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There seems then to be some tentative support here for the Wilkinson
hypothesis, but these results need to be read with some care. In particular, the
strongest evidence appears to be from Italy, but this may be misleading, as only
small differences divide the Italian income, poverty and inequality distributions. A
comparison of Figures 4.8 (the decile ratio) and 7.2 (SMR) show that it could be just
the very low levels of both variables in the Central region which is ensuring that the
decile ratio has a better fit with SMR than does average household income. Results
from both the UK and Germany do suggest that the decile ratio has an explanatory
role independent of that of income – but only in the UK case is the effect of the sign
predicted. Our inequality variable is not very robust, as has been discussed, and a
more precise measure may have stronger predictive power, but the current analysis
provides only very weak support for Wilkinson.
The same exercise was also carried out for the IMR, although strong results
were not expected: there is less reason to expect a relationship between the IMR and
inequality, Figure 7.3 showed little sign of a link between IMR and poverty within
countries, while strong multicollinearity between regional average income and
Poverty N make it unlikely that separate effects will be identified for either variable
controlling for the other. Taking all countries together, Poverty N again turned out
to be the best explanatory factor, this time explaining 33 percent of the variation
(twice as much as the variation in SMR). With country dummies included, Poverty N
is still the best explanatory variable, but the dummies alone explain 36 percent of the
variation and the poverty rate only an additional 11 percent. For Italy, Poverty N
also turns out to have the best fit, alone explaining 42 percent of the varation, with
average income explaining 31 percent and the decile ratio 29 percent. But for the UK,
Germany, France and Spain none of the variables were significant.
Subjective health
The ECHP contains questions both on self-assessed health status and on the extent of
use of medical services (e.g. number of recent visits to a doctor; whether or not the
respondent has been admitted to hospital in the last twelve months). As there is
evidence that higher social classes and income groups are more likely to make use of
medical services, and as the role played in health care by in-patient treatment differs
across countries, this section focuses on self-assessed health measures. In particular,
it looks at responses to two questions. First, it considers the percentage in each
region responding ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ to the question ‘How is your health in
general?’. Second, it looks at the share reporting to have ‘cut back on normal activity
during the last two weeks due to ill-health or injury’. While the first question should
reflect the respondent’s wider health, the second picks up on the prevalence of short-
term illness.
Responses to the two questions are presented in Maps 7.1 and 7.2 to give us
an overview of the geography of self-assessed health in Europe. It is immediately
clear that the two measures give us very different pictures. General health is held to
be worst in Portugal and western Spain (except Madrid), in central and southern
Italy and in Wales. Southern England, Ireland and eastern France do well. But the
areas most affected by illness or injury in the two weeks prior to the survey are quite
different. Northern Europe is hardest hit, while Italy and Greece do best. Fewer than
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seven percent of the population have been affected in any Greek or Italian region,
compared to one in five people in Scotland, Wales and North-East England.27
The second question is how well these indicators correlate with the ‘objective’
evidence of mortality data. Correlation between the SMR and the general health
variable is of particular interest.28 But the relationship between these two measures is
very weak, both across the EU as a whole and within most of the larger countries.
This is illustrated in Figure 7.5, which shows the two variables for Spain, France,
Italy and the UK. (The self-assessed health measure is not age-standardised, but to
prevent the most serious effects of regional differences in population age-structure,
results for respondents 65 years and over have been excluded: this in practice has the
effect of weakening the relation with regional SMR.) Coefficients of correlation
between the two series are insignificant for every country shown. For Italy, the
relation is negative (though still not significant). It is interesting that both variables
(uniquely among those examined in the paper) defy the Italian north-south divide,
but due to quite different good and bad regional performances. Self-reported bad
health in Wales is strikingly high, and calls for further investigation.
Finally, there is the issue of how the self-reported indicators relate to regional
income and to rates of poverty and inequality. Do self-assessed health measures
provide any evidence in support of the Wilkinson hypothesis, for instance? An
exercise similar to that undertaken above came up with equally mixed results, but
with different factors showing up as significant for several countries – perhaps not
surprising given low levels of correlation between the two health measures. Taking
all regions together, average household income is the only significant factor in
explaining poor general health, accounting for some 20 percent of variation. In the
UK, the best fit is provided by the same model used in the SMR regression: average
income and the decile ratio between them account for 53 percent of variation. For
France, the same two factors are able to explain some 47 percent of variation. For
Spain, however, the decile ratio is insignificant and it is Poverty N in combination
with average income which provides the best fit, accounting for almost 80 percent of
variation – but the coefficient on the poverty variable is negative. And finally, in
Italy, none of the variables turn out to be significant. This is not surprising given the
strong north-south cleavages in each of the income and inequality variables and the
much less clear-cut results for the health variable. Again then, while there is some
support for the Wilkinson hypothesis, evidence is mixed.29
27
It is not clear from the ECHP documentation at which time of year the surveys were carried
out; this is clearly a relevant consideration in interpreting responses to this question.
28
Of course, it is quite plausible that subjective health measures might in fact be correlated not
with current but with future mortality, but this cannot be currently tested in the absence of
earlier data on self-assessed health.
29
Taking all countries together, N=43 and the coefficient on average income is –0.00059 (s.e.
0.00017). For Spain, N=7, the average income coefficient is –0.0092 (0.0024) and the poverty
coefficient is –0.98 (-2.86). For France, N=8, the income coefficient is –0.00088 (0.00032) and the
inequality coefficient is 4.92 (2.39). For the UK, N=11, the income coefficient is –0.0019
(0.00065) and the inequality coefficient 8.67 (2.62).
Figure 7.5: Self-assessed health from the ECHP 1996
and SMR 1998
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8. Social participation
The indicators in each of the above domains could be seen as important factors
facilitating social participation; in some cases even as necessary conditions. One of
the arguments for a relative poverty line, for instance, is that low relative income can
exclude people from participating in everyday life. Alongside other benefits,
participation in the productive sphere brings a circle of acquaintances and day to
day contact with others. Without basic literacy skills many aspects of participation
would become very difficult – although education can also create a divide between
individuals and their communities.
But while all these factors may make social participation more or less likely,
this section aims to pick up directly on the degree to which people are and feel
integrated with friends, family and community. In looking for indicators, we can
distinguish between three levels of participation.
First, we might want to measure integration at the most local level. Do people
know their neighbours? Are they in regular contact with friends and/or family?
Participation at this level might itself be separated into two aspects: does a person
have the everyday human contact most people need in order to thrive; and does she
have somewhere to turn in a time of crisis?
Second, we might be interested in wider participation in clubs and networks.
The literature on social capital draws a distinction between ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’
forms of capital, where bonding social capital connects one to one’s own kin and
community, while bridging capital stretches across social divides (see e.g. Putnam,
2000, p.22). Membership of a local running club, for instance, might bring people
together across class and race lines. Bridging social capital is held to strengthen
society by forging links between diverse groups of people, while also benefiting the
individual by widening his circle of contacts and increasing his exposure to different
sources of information: bonding social capital has been argued to be good for
‘getting by’ and bridging social capital for ‘getting ahead’ (Xavier de Souza Briggs,
quoted in Putnam, 2000, p.23). As such, the degree of regional participation in clubs
and societies should tell us something about the well-being of individuals in the
region and perhaps also something about the health of the society in general.
Finally, there is the issue of political participation, reflecting a sense that one
is involved with and able to affect wider political decisions, that one has a voice.
Voter turnout rates are one weak measure of this, as abstention implies disaffection
with the system and a belief that one’s vote makes no difference; membership of
political parties and pressure groups and participation in demonstrations might be
better indicators. Ideally, we would want to look at these types of indicator
alongside measures of how democratic a society really is; i.e. to examine the reality
of involvement in decision-making alongside the illusion.
But are there data available that will allow us to measure these aspects of
social participation at regional level? The most promising source is the ECHP, which
includes several questions on social relations: frequency of contact with neighbours
and frequency of meetings and phone conversations with people from outside the
household are covered, although there are no questions covering access to support in
the event of a crisis. Below I examine an indicator of social contact which combines
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responses to two questions: ‘How often do you talk to any of your neighbours?’ and
‘How often do you meet friends or relatives who are not living with you?’
The ECHP also includes a question on membership of clubs and
organisations, offering potential (limited) insight into the extent of regional
participation in the wider community. The question provides only a two-way
division between membership in any clubs and membership in none (the question
gives as examples ‘a sport or entertainment club, a local or neighbourhood group, a
party etc.’). Beyond this, data on club membership is difficult to find even at national
level. Robert Putnam’s 1992 book, Making Democracy Work (p.91 onwards) uses quite
detailed data on the density of different types of club at regional level for Italy, but
Putnam admits to being fortunate that a census of all associations in Italy, local and
national, had been carried out in the previous decade; even so, all data were for 1982.
Similar and more recent censuses may, of course, have been carried out for other
countries, but these have been hard to find.
Similarly, data on party membership at regional level are not easily available,
while regional data on participation in demonstrations can probably be ruled out.
Voter turnouts should be available by region, offering some information on political
participation, at least for those countries in which voting is not compulsory, but this
aspect of social participation is not examined in this paper.
The two ECHP indicators are presented in Figure 8.1. The upper part of the
figure shows the share of respondents by region who report to being a member of a
club or organisation, while the lower part shows the share who meet friends or
relatives not living with them at least once a week and/or talk to their neighbours at
least once a week. The remainder, in other words, appear to have no social contact
with somebody outside the household in the average week.
The first thing to note about the club membership variable is the wide
disparity in the importance of clubs and organisations across EU member states.
Fewer than one in ten Greeks appear to be club members, in comparison with 60
percent of Danes. There is also a clear north-south divide within the EU, with clubs
playing a much smaller role in southern Europe than in Germany, Austria, the UK
and Scandinavia. The most striking internal disparity is in Belgium, with the
Flemish-speaking part of the country behaving very much like the Netherlands with
regard to clubs, while the French-speaking part looks just like France.
These large cross-country differences do raise questions about the cultural
judgements involved in counting association membership. We argued above that
clubs are valuable in offering links to wider social groups and classes, while regular
social contact is likely to remain more limited and limiting. But is this necessarily the
case? Can we say that the abundance of clubs is one aspect of northern life which is
superior? Or does the Greek cafe offer an alternative and equally valid way of
consorting across social groups? The problem is that while it seems plausible that
clubs would lead to a broader set of social relationships, proving it is very hard to
do.
Robert Putnam argues that the ‘vibrancy of associational life’ is a key
indicator of ‘civic sociability’ (p.91) and that the number of clubs gives us an
important clue as to ‘which regions most closely approximate the ideal of the civic
community’. Interestingly, though, while his data (which counts density of clubs, not
club membership) support his hypothesis that civic life is much better developed in
northern than in southern Italy, the ECHP data give a rather different impression. As
Figure
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Figure 8.1 shows, regional disparity in club membership in Italy is fairly low,
ranging between 11 and 24 percent of the population. Nor is there a clear north-
south divide. The North and Central regions are those where membership is highest,
while the lowest levels are in Abruzzi (just south of central Italy), followed by
Campania and the South region. But Sicily and Sardinia fall somewhere in the
middle: membership rates in Sicily are 16 percent, compared to 18 percent in the
Milan region of Lombardy.
Turning to the bottom half of Figure 8.1, we see that the social contact variable
displays even lower within-country variation. Again, the largest level of disparity is
for Belgium, though this time it is the Flemish speaking part where social relations
are at their lowest. But the most obvious point is the very low levels of social contact
recorded for France. Between 20 and 35 percent of respondents in all French regions
claim that they do not meet friends or relations or speak to neighbours at least once a
week. This seems unlikely and unfortunately suggests that there may be problems
with the translation or coding of the variable.
9. Conclusions
This paper set out to explore regional disparity in a range of indicators of well-being
across the European Union. It aimed to examine how far national average indicators
disguise internal regional differences; and to see whether different indicators would
tell the same regional story. These conclusions sum up what we have found in each
of these areas in turn. First, though, they highlight the main constraints presented by
existing data.
Data sources and data holes
In the light of the EU Social Agenda drawn up at the Nice summit in December 2000,
the European Commission is pushing ahead with work to identify a set of target
indicators of poverty and social exclusion. There appears to be a commitment to
track regional disparities in at least some of these. But for certain key indicators
existing data sources do not allow us to be confident about differences across regions
even at a single point in time.
Most strikingly, analysis of Luxembourg Income Study data showed that
existing national household surveys for several countries do not allow us to rank
regions by average household income with statistical certainty, even at the heavily
aggregated NUTS1 level. Poverty and inequality rates, which make greater demands
on the data, are more problematic still. Results suggest that several thousand
respondents per region (as in the Spanish Expenditure and Income Survey) would
be needed to separate regional poverty rates, although a minimum of 1500
respondents per region (as in the French Family Budget Survey) might allow results
of some usefulness. In the UK Family Expenditure Survey and German Social
Economic Panel Study, with well below one thousand respondents in most regions,
standard errors are just too large for results to be robust.
Indicators on employment and educational attainment present fewer
statistical problems, as sample sizes in the European Labour Force Survey are huge
relative to income survey samples – upwards of 10,000 households in most NUTS1
39
regions, allowing significant breakdown at NUTS2 level as well. But no educational
outcome measures can be tracked as the recent spurt of international surveys of
learning achievement and literacy allow only very limited sub-national analysis.
Finally, the health and social participation sections of the paper drew on the
European Community Household Panel as well as on administrative data on
mortality. As with LIS data, ECHP data can be analysed at NUTS1 level for most EU
countries, but the same problems of small sample sizes arise (ECHP regional
samples are on the whole smaller than those in the LIS datasets). The variables used
in the paper are constructed from responses to questions with between two (‘yes’ or
‘no’) and five possible answers, and samples are large enough to support this sort of
analysis. But bigger samples would be needed to explore the interrelationships
between variables at regional level, or to exploit income variables. This is an issue
the Commission might bear in mind as work continues on the ECHP’s successor, the
EU-SILC.
Regional dispersion
With what we have, though, what can we say about the extent of regional disparities
in well-being in the EU? Stepping back from the detail to summarise and compare
results across domains is difficult without any dispersion measures to hold on to –
but it would be misleading to compare a coefficient of variation for Belgium (with
three NUTS1 regions) with one for Germany (with sixteen). One way round this
problem is to make comparisons only within a sub-group of countries with a similar
number of regions. Table 9.1 presents coefficients of variation for three country
groupings: countries in the first group contain three or four NUTS1 regions each;
Spain and France in the second group have seven or eight regions; and in the third
group each country contains between eleven and sixteen regions. (In each case,
coefficients of variation have been calculated using weighted populations to make
sure that small regional outliers do not disproportionately affect results.) The highest
level of regional disparity for each indicator in each group is highlighted dark.
It is immediately clear that high regional disparities in one domain need not
necessarily result in large disparities in others. For instance, Belgium has much
higher coefficients of variation than other countries in its group for GDP per capita,
poverty rates (measured using a national standard), unemployment, self-assessed
general health and club membership, but displays relatively low disparity in
inequality, educational attainment and infant mortality rates. In contrast, Greece has
very low disparity in GDP per capita and a much lower coefficient of variation for
unemployment than Belgium, but very high disparities for the share of working-age
men not in work, educational attainment and the short-term health measure. Austria
displays strong regional cohesion: the only area of high disparity is the share of the
unemployed who have been out of work long-term.
The other two groups of countries show a similarly mixed story, although
again in each case one country stands out as having greater disparity overall.
Regional disparities are higher in Spain than in France in several areas, including the
national-standard poverty rate, unemployment (just), educational attainment, infant
mortality and teenage fertility. France shows greater dispersion in GDP per capita
(just), poverty measured against a regional standard and short-term health, with
little difference in the dispersion measures for other indicators.
Table 9.1: Weighted coefficients of variation
Belgium Austria Greece Netherlands Spain France Italy UK Germany
observations 3 3 4 4 7 8 11 12 16
GDP 1998 0.25 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.11 0.21
Average income 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.15 0.23 0.10 0.10
Poverty (nat std) 0.20 0.04 0.11 0.43 0.30 0.70 0.19 0.25
Poverty (reg std) 0.06 0.10 0.23 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.10 0.24
Decile ratio 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.20 0.06 0.15
Housing 0.66 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.33 0.51 0.61
Unemp 0.42 0.14 0.24 0.12 0.24 0.21 0.62 0.19 0.44
LTU 0.07 0.56 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.23 0.13 0.12
Not-in-work 0.16 0.07 0.59 0.07 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.20 0.18
ISCED3 0.01 0.03 0.28 0.03 0.16 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.07
Particip at 17 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.03
SMR 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.09
IMR 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.26 0.13 0.11
Bad health 0.30 0.21 0.10 0.25 0.21 0.15 0.36
Cut back 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.18 0.32 0.27
Club membership 0.31 0.09 0.21 0.16 0.16 0.23 0.11
Spoken to friends/neighbs 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.01
Highest cv in group
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In the third group, the largest regional divisions are clearly in Italy:
coefficients of variation are substantially higher than for the UK and Germany for a
majority of the indicators. But disparities are higher in the UK for housing quality,
SMR, self-assessed health, participation in education at 17 and the not-in-work rate.
Italy and Germany have well-documented regional cleavages, so results for
Italy are of little surprise, although those for Germany may be seen as unexpected.
Despite the East-West divide, German coefficients of variation for GDP, average
income and poverty (national standard) are lower than for Spain or France, even
though there are twice the number of German regions.
The message of Table 9.1 is that, while we can pick out Belgium, Spain and
Italy from their groups as the countries with the highest levels of regional disparity
overall, a high coefficient of variation in one indicator does not necessarily tell us
anything at all about the level of dispersion in another.30 This is important given the
recent EU decision that a single dispersion indicator, the coefficient of variation of
regional unemployment rates, should be used as the sole measure of regional
disparity in social inclusion. As has been discussed in the main body of the paper,
there are particular problems with the choice of the unemployment rate as the
indicator to track, because it is so strongly affected by the economic cycle – in many
countries, as unemployment falls, regional dispersion rises, because employment
booms take off in high employment regions first. But Figure 9.1 also provides
evidence that the choice of any single indicator to track disparity would be arbitrary
and potentially misleading.
Links between aspects of well-being
We have seen that high disparities in some indicators or domains do not necessarily
mean high disparities in others. But how far does this just reflect a stretching out or
compressing of a single distribution, and how far is there a reshuffling of regional
positions? Do disparities reflect multi-dimensional regional divides within countries
or do rankings change from indicator to indicator?
Table 9.2 presents the coefficients of correlation between regional GDP per
capita in 1998 and each of the other regional indicators for the five largest EU
countries. The pale highlighting shows a significant positive correlation (in the sense
that better performance on GDP means better performance on the indicator in
general) while the darker highlighting shows a significant negative correlation. Thus
a string of pale boxes shows consistency in regional performance across indicators,
implying in turn that a single indicator such as GDP per capita could be taken as a
reasonable proxy for wider regional well-being. Dark boxes suggest the opposite:
better performance on some indicators goes hand in hand with worse performance
on others.
As expected, average household income is strongly correlated in all countries
with GDP per capita, as is poverty measured against a national poverty line, with
30
It also tells us nothing, of course, about the average level of the indicator: dispersion
indicators need to be considered in the context of the national average if they are to be used
on their own as indicators of national performance. For instance, while the rate of regional
disparity for poverty rates is lower in the UK than in either Germany or France, poverty rates
in most UK regions are higher than in most German or French regions.
Table 9.2: Correlation coefficients for regional well-being indicators and GDP per capita 1998
Average
household
income
Poverty
rate
(national
standard)
Poverty
rate
(regional
standard)
Decile
ratio
Housing
poor on
at least
three
counts
Unemp
rate LTU
Not-in-
work
rate
ISCED3
attainment
17 yr old
participation
rate SMR IMR
Bad or
very
bad
health
Cut
back in
last two
weeks
Not a
member
of any
club
See
friends/
neigbhours
less than
once a
week
France 0.97 -0.74 0.65 0.68 0.18 -0.36 -0.16 -0.44 0.43 -0.60 0.48 -0.44 -0.35 0.46 0.23
Germany 0.78 -0.45 0.42 0.54 -0.67 -0.05 -0.48 -0.76 0.75 -0.92 0.25
Italy 0.96 -0.92 -0.48 -0.83 -0.59 -0.92 -0.74 -0.84 0.66 -0.56 -0.63 -0.16 0.47 -0.74 -0.15
Spain 0.91 -0.81 -0.14 -0.34 0.01 -0.74 0.43 -0.87 0.92 0.58 -0.56 0.09 -0.90 -0.51 -0.40 0.25
UK 0.81 -0.53 0.69 0.70 -0.32 0.03** -0.57 -0.82 0.32 0.14 -0.59 -0.23 -0.73 -0.57 -0.49 -0.02
EU total 0.61 -0.56 -0.01 -0.08 -0.29 -0.48 -0.16 -0.37 0.27 0.45 -0.24 -0.20 -0.32 -0.02 -0.26 0.19
Total regions 61 61 61 61 47 68 67 67 67 37 61 68 47 47 47 47
*For purposes of presentation, high GDP regions are 'expected' to have lower poverty, lower inequality, lower unemployment, higher educational attainment,
lower mortality and lower teenage fertility. Highlighted correlations are significant at the 10 percent level.
** With London excluded this correlation is -0.81 and is significant at the 1 percent level.
correlation significant at 10 percent level and of sign expected*
correlation significant at 10 percent level but not of sign expected*
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poverty lower in richer regions. However, in three out of the five countries, richer
regions tend to have higher inequality and higher poverty measured against a
regional poverty line. Italy, and to a lesser degree Spain, are the exceptions here.
Putting poverty and inequality aside and focusing on the remaining twelve
indicators, there is just one country, Italy, in which regional GDP seems a very good
proxy for overall well-being. Eight out of the eleven indicators for which Italian data
are available are strongly correlated with GDP – all but the two self-assessed health
measures, social contact and the regional poverty rate. In Spain, Germany and the
UK, GDP appears to reflect some aspects of well-being but not others, with only four
or five of the indicators showing strong correlations. (ISCED3 attainment among the
working-age population in Germany is significantly higher where GDP is lower,
reflecting the historically high investment in education in former East German
regions.) But in France not a single indicator other than average household income
and the poverty rate (measured against a national standard) is significantly
correlated with GDP at regional level.
On an EU-wide basis, GDP seems at first glance very well correlated with
wider well-being: in addition to average household income and the national
standard poverty rate, nine of the remaining indicators show a positive and
significant correlation with GDP per capita. On closer inspection, it becomes
apparent that the correlations are in fact much weaker than those at national level:
the test statistic depends on both the strength of the relationship between two
variables and the number of observations, so a larger number of regions allows us to
be more certain that correlations are significantly different than zero, even at lower
correlation values. None of the correlations across the EU as a whole are larger than
0.50, while many of those within single countries are higher than 0.80. Of course, it is
not surprising that correlations are weaker when we treat the EU as a Europe of the
regions: country effects will clearly be important and a simple linear relationship
across all EU regions would be unlikely. But the idea is to see how far a single
variable, per capita GDP, often used to rank regions across the EU as a whole, is
indeed reflecting other aspects of life. The answer is that it can only do this to a
limited extent.
What does this tell us about the existence of multiple deprivation among
regions? So far, we have looked at correlations between indicators across the full
range of regions. To examine the extent of multiple deprivation we need to focus on
the worst performers on each indicator. Regions ranking in the bottom ten on each
indicator in turn were identified. Are these always the same regions? To ensure that
results were consistent, regions were only considered if all variables were available,
making the exercise really applicable to a subset of the EU only: Austria, Belgium,
France, Italy, Spain and the UK were examined. (Participation in education at
seventeen was also dropped because data were missing for so many countries.)
Of the six countries (42 regions) included, there are five regions which do
consistently badly, ranking in the bottom ten in between ten and twelve out of
fifteen indicators. One of these regions is the Canary Islands; the other four are all in
southern Italy (Sicily, Sardinia, the South and Campania). Other than these five,
however, the bottom-ranked regions are a shifting group. Only three regions rank
bottom in six or seven out of fifteen indicators (North East Spain, South Spain and
Yorkshire and Humberside in the UK); while a further eight are in the bottom group
in four or five (Central Spain, North West Italy, Brussels, and five UK regions – the
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North East, North West, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland). Only two regions
(Western Austria and Central Italy) never fall into the bottom group – although a
further thirteen rank bottom on just one indicator, and in nine out of these thirteen
the indicator is either club membership or social contact, in which country
determinants of outcomes are so strong as to put the variables into some doubt (six
out of the eight French regions fall into this category).
There is a pattern across countries in the particular variables on which regions
perform badly. The Spanish and Italian regions rank poorly on GDP, housing,
poverty measured against a national standard, unemployment and the not-in-work
rate, and on the general health measure. They tend to do fine on regional inequality,
on all other health measures (SMR, IMR and short-term ill health) and on social
contact. In contrast, the UK regions (with the exception of Northern Ireland) are not
in the bottom group for GDP but do badly on all the poverty and inequality
indicators, and on most of the health measures – SMR and short-term ill health
consistently, and often also on IMR and self-assessed general health. Performance in
Austria, Belgium and France, where no region ranks in the bottom ten on more than
four indicators (and most only on one or two) is harder to classify.
Summary
To summarise, while it is clear that household surveys need to be larger for many
countries if regional statistics are to be treated as robust, this paper has shown that a
considerable amount can be learnt about regional disparities in Europe from
currently available data. Some of the results to emerge from the evidence examined
have reinforced what we already knew (Belgium and Italy are already countries with
well-established regional divides, for example). But the paper has also shown that
different indicators tell very different stories, both about the degree of disparity
within a given country, and about the identity of the worst-performing regions.
These findings are particularly important given the recent EU decision to use the
coefficient of variation of regional unemployment rates as the single proxy for
overall regional disparity within a country. The paper strongly supports the
alternative suggestion that all inclusion indicators should instead be analysed at
regional level (Atkinson et al., 2002); and has demonstrated that for many areas this
is already possible – and offers some thought-provoking results.
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